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The following is an excerpt from The New Rational. Manager. You will be provided a paperback or ebook version of the book when you attend a Kepner-. Surely, this explains in part the enduring appeal of The New Rational Manager and its several sequels. The original book was published by Mc- Graw Hill in. Tregoe, Benjamin B. and Charles H. Kepner The New Rational The less effective managers we observed did not have these organizational skdls.

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The New Rational Manager Pdf

One of the best-selling business books of all time, The New Rational Manager, describes Kepner-Tregoe critical thinking processes for effective leadership and . The New Rational Manager by Benjamin B. Tregoe, December , Kepner- Tregoe edition, Paperback in English. Trove: Find and get Australian resources. Books, images, historic newspapers, maps, archives and more.

Not in United States? Choose your country's store to see books available for download. See if you have enough points for this item. Sign in. One of the best-selling business books of all time, The New Rational Manager, describes Kepner-Tregoe critical thinking processes for effective leadership and issue-resolution management that have been pressure tested across the world for over 50 years. This common language and process are essential for effective, efficient collaboration across teams, functions, and geographies. Are you looking for an edge to advance your career? The same principles found in The New Rational Manager that were leveraged by NASA to return Apollo XIII safely to earth have also been used by C-Suite executives, managers, and engineers to increase quality, improve efficiency, and lower costs in almost all industries and business functions. The New Rational Manager has the business cases to prove it and the steps for you to make it happen. Thinking, Fast and Slow. Daniel Kahneman. George R. A Dance with Dragons. The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo.

The writing was also quite dry at times which made it a bit of slog to get through - I skimmed through the last two chapters as it seemed to only relevant to senior managers. It outlines the easy steps to improve your performance in following situations: - Understand the situation: What's happening?

What to do? Where to start? What's the best way to solve it? What are my goals? What is the best option? What are the opportunities? How do I s I believe this is an essential read for people struggling with many problems and assignments in their jobs. How do I succeed with both? I liked the book or high concentration of valuable information, simplicity, and easy language. It is written back in 's but it shares management principles that can be applied today, tomorrow and in years from now.

The main theme of the book is performance management, problem analysis, problem solving, future constraints prognosis and human performance in organisations.

Interim action gradually becomes standard operating procedure. The Case of the Leaking Soybean Oil Filter was reconstructed as a Problem Analysis for plant employees who were learning to use the tech- niques.

It made the point very well that the roulette approach, however familiar, produces frustration and misunderstanding more often than re- sults. Motivation to use a systematic approach grew as soon as the em- ployees recognized that they had worked for several days on a mess that could have been corrected permanently in a matter of hours. The remainder of this chapter is a step-by-step demonstration of Prob- lem Analysis, exactly as it could have been used when the leaking oil fil- ter problem was first observed.

We do this with the problem statement, or the name of the prob- lem. It is important to name the problem precisely because all the work to follow—all the description, analysis, and explanation we will undertake —will be directed at correcting the problem as it has been named.

We must describe exactly what we see, feel, hear, smell, or taste that tells us there is a deviation. It is tempting to combine two or more deviations in a single problem- solving effort or to try to bunch a bevy of seemingly related problems into one overall problem.

Nearly everyone has attended meetings during which two or more distinct problems were tied ankle to ankle in a kind of problem-solving sack race. This procedure is almost always inefficient and unproductive. Within each we ask specifying questions that will flesh out our description of how the deviation presents itself to our sens- es. The answers to the questions will give us exactly the kinds of infor- mation that will be most useful for the analysis.

See Figure 3. This illustrates the fact that every problem is unique, and its context reflects that uniqueness. As a re- sult, one or more of the specifying questions may not produce useful in- formation. Nevertheless, we ask. We always attempt to answer every question. Our choice of wording should indicate that our five senses have detected a problem.

When we are dealing with a human performance problem, however, we must alter the questions to reflect the fact that we are ob- serving people and behavior, not units and malfunctions. There are other variations on the basic techniques. When we are working with human performance, we usually need to use a combination of Rational Process ideas—not only those found within the Problem Analysis process.

For these reasons, human performance is dealt with separately in Chapter Eight, after all the Rational Processes have been explained. It is the second half that will render it a useful tool for analysis. Such data would give us what we need to conduct an analysis: Suppose for a moment that you have two identical potted plants grow- ing in your office.

One thrives but the other does not. If you take the wilt- ing plant out of the office and ask someone about the probable cause for its sorry appearance, you will get any number of educated guesses.

Regardless of the content of a problem, nothing is more conducive to sound analysis than some relevant basis of comparison. In Problem Analysis, we conduct the search for bases of comparison in all four dimensions of the specification. We will now repeat our prob- lem statement and the specifying questions and answers, and add a third column called Closest Logical Comparison. The closer the comparison, the more tightly the dimensions of the problem will be defined.

Let us see how this works out in Figure 4. Note that the second specifying question in the WHAT dimension does not suggest a close, logical comparison. In this case, leaking oil can- not be compared usefully with any other specific malfunction with the hatch. The decision as to what is close and what is logical must rest with the judgment of the problem solver or the team. Each Problem Analysis is unique to the content of each problem. Once we have identified bases of comparison in all four dimensions, we are able to isolate key distinguishing features of the problem.

This ap- proach is similar to describing the outlines of a shadow. With the comple- tion of the IS NOT data in our specification, the outlines begin to suggest the components capable of having cast the shadow.

Experts and those close to the problem may have ideas about possible causes but will still find the information in the specification useful. Brainstorming is an effec- tive technique to use to quickly list many ideas without evaluating or dis- cussing them.

The purpose is to cast a large net in search for the true cause. In all cases, a short statement that describes how the cause works is needed. Simply pointing to the gasket as the cause will not help us con- firm or eliminate it as a cause. What about the gasket creates the leak? Is it too large, too small, too hard, or too soft? Saying that uneven surfaces of gaskets allow leakage suggests a different cause and, perhaps, a differ- ent fix than saying that the square corners cause the gasket to seal incor- rectly.

If this search yields only implausible causes, or produces far more causes than can reasonably be evaluated in the time available, then con- sider distinctions and changes. What is distinctive about the Number One Filter compared with the others? What stands out? Let us re- turn for a moment to the wilted potted plant in a dim corner of the office.

With a basis of comparison the identical plant that thrives on a sunny window sill , we quickly see a factor that is highly suggestive of cause. This natural cause-and-effect thinking pattern that we all employ ensures that we all use this kind of reasoning when confronted with a problem provided that we observe a distinction that taps something in our experience.

We will now repeat all the columns we have already developed and add a column headed What Is Distinctive About…. This is shown in Figure 5. The question we ask to elicit distinc- tions is this: One or more dimensions frequently yield no distinc- tions at all. Obviously, the goal is quality: Managers who may never have heard of Problem Analysis know that a decline in a formerly acceptable performance suggests that something has changed; common sense tells them to look for that change.

Instead of searching through this mass of changes to find that one, elusive, problem-creating change, we examine the one, small, clearly de- fined area in which we can be sure of finding it: This is the next step in Problem Analysis. Even if we knew the exact number and kind of changes that had occurred, which ones would we want to examine first? Six changes that affected all five filters? Or two that affected only the Number One Filter?

Or seven that affected operations during the past six months? Or one that was instituted only a day or a week before the problem was first observed?

We are bypassing any changes that may have occurred but are not relevant to the key features of this problem. The relationship of distinctions and changes and the rela- tionship of both to the generation of possible causes are very important. Suppose that, when the problem was first recognized, a problem ana- lyst had been presented with the distinction of the square-cornered gasket on the leaking filter. He or she might not have grasped its significance. Why not? Because unimportant distinctions abound between one thing and another and between one period of time and another.

Compare any two pieces of equipment that have been in place for a few years and you will usually find a number of distinctive features about each.

Parts have broken and been repaired. New, perhaps slightly different, parts have re- placed worn-out ones. Operating procedures may vary slightly from one to the other for any of a dozen reasons. The leaking filter might have had a different type of gasket for five years yet never have leaked until recently.

But when this distinction is ap- preciated as representing a change—and a change that occurred the evening before the leaking was observed—its significance as a clue is greatly heightened.

This is shown in Figure 6. Several possible causes will sometimes emerge. Two changes operating in combination may produce a performance deviation that one of those changes alone cannot. We identify possible causes by asking the following question of each item in the categories of distinctions and changes: Beginning at the top of Figure 6—distinctions and changes rel- ative to WHAT—we immediately notice the combination of a distinction and a change: Possible Cause: The square-cornered gasket a distinction between the Number One Filter and the other four from the new supplier a change rep- resented in that distinction is too thin and unevenly constructed.

This caused the Number One Filter to leak oil. Other possible causes can be generated from the distinctions and changes in our analysis. Knowing the true cause, they will not appear to be strong contenders, but they are possible.

We will describe them in or- der to help explain the testing step of Problem Analysis in the following section. It was noted that the northeast corner of the filter house, where the Number One Filter stands, contains the feedwater pump. This distinction has some significance: The leaking filter is exposed to considerably greater vibra- tion than the other four filters. This represents no change. It has always been that way. We know from the specification, moreover, that the cur- rent leakage is occurring at the cleanout hatch, not at the valves.

When vibration caused leakage in the past, it occurred at the valves. Vi- bration is given the benefit of the doubt. Vibration from the feedwater pump in the northeast cor- ner of the filter house distinction in the dimension of WHERE causes the Number One Filter to leak oil.

By including all possible causes, we lose nothing, maintain our objectivity, and reduce the incidence of conflict and disagreement in the explanation of a problem. In the testing step of Problem Analysis, we let the facts in the specification perform the func- tion of judging the relative likelihood of possible causes.

Effects are specific, not general. Testing for cause is a process of matching the details of a postulated cause with the details of an observed effect to see whether that cause could have produced that effect. If vibration from the feedwater pump is the true cause of the Number One Filter leaking oil, then how does it explain why why: Vibration previously affected the valves and not the cleanout hatch. Why would vibration cause leaking to begin three days ago and not be- fore?

Unless we are willing to make some rather broad assumptions, we cannot make this possible cause fit the observed effects. Our judgment tells us that this is an improbable explanation at best.

Another possible cause is suggested by the distinctions and changes found in our analysis: New maintenance people a distinction that also repre- sents a change in the WHEN dimension are not using a torque wrench to close the cleanout hatch. This is causing the Number One Filter to leak. After all, the same peo- ple are responsible for maintaining all five filters. If they failed to use a torque wrench on the Number One Filter, why would they do so on all the others?

We would have to make broad assumptions to make the cause fit the observed effects: The actual cause fits all the details of the effect as specified: It requires no as- sumptions at all to make it work. It fits as hand does to glove, as cause and effect must fit. There is less likelihood of the other possible causes being true. But this most likely possible cause seldom proves to be, beyond the shadow of a doubt, the true cause.

Of course this is not always the case. Often, several possible causes, including the true cause, carry as- sumptions that must be true if the cause is to be true. Which cause has the most reasonable assumptions? Which cause has the sim- plest assumptions?

Some- times judgment is needed to select the most probable cause. To improve our chances of success, however, we need to spend time and effort in confirming the cause. It depends on bringing in additional information and taking additional actions. To confirm a likely cause is to prove that it did produce the observed effect. In our example all we need to do is simply look at the gasket in operation and see whether it leaks observe.

Or, we can trade the gasket from the Number One Filter for the non-leaking gasket from one of the other filters experiment. Or, we can obtain a gasket with rounded cor- ners from the old supplier, install it, and see whether the leaking stops try a fix and monitor. Any of these would prove that the leaking result- ed from the installation of a new, thinner, square-cornered gasket bought at a bargain price.

Sometimes no direct confirmation is possible and we must rely on our assumptions. A rocket booster explodes in flight. Most of the tangible ev- idence is destroyed. We would certainly not want a second such accident. The assumptions must be true in order for the cause to be true. Confirmation is possible in most problem situations.

What it consists of will depend on the circumstances. We want to use the safest, surest, cheapest, easiest, quickest method. A mechanical problem may be dupli- cated by consciously introducing a distinction or a change that seems highly indicative of cause. In that case, confirmation provides correc- tive action. Resolution coincides with the last step in the process of Prob- lem Analysis.

While the most common cause of failure is too little data in the specification, there are three other major reasons for failing to solve a problem despite using Problem Analysis: Using inaccurate or vague information to describe the problem. Insufficiently identifying key distinctions and changes related to the IS data in the specification.

Allowing assumptions to distort judgment during the testing step. There is nothing wrong with making assump- tions as long as we regard them as such and do not prematurely grant them the status of fact. However, there are limitations to the power of the process to produce the right answers.

If we cannot track down the key facts needed to crack a problem, that problem will continue to defy solution. No approach or process, however systematically or meticulously applied, will unlock its secret. Yet the struc- ture of all problems is always the same. It is knowledge of this structure that enables us to move systematically from definition to description to evaluation to hypothesis to confirmation of cause. The Problem Statement is a concise description of both the object of our concern and the deviation or malfunction for which we want to find the cause.

Our own Knowledge and Experience, or that of experts, may sug- gest possible causes. Using the specification as a guide, we look to generate as many possible causes as we reasonably can. We then test these against the specification. If we have too many or too few causes to consider, or if all of the causes we generate fail to test against the specification, we look for Distinctions—features in all four dimensions that characterize only the IS data. We then study each distinction to determine whether it also repre- sents a Change.

It is at this point in our analysis that we recognize the square-cornered gasket on the leaking filter—not only as a dis- tinctive feature of that filter but also as a change. Until the day before the problem appeared, the Number One Filter had been equipped with the same type of round-cornered gasket used on the other units. When all the distinctions and changes have been identified, we begin to Identify Possible Causes. Each distinction and change is exam- ined for clues to cause.

Each resultant hypothesis of cause is stated to illustrate not only what caused the problem but how it did so: This caused the Number One Filter to leak. To graduate to the status of Most Probable Cause, it must explain or withstand all the facts in the specification. Vibration, as a possible cause, is less likely to have produced the problem than the installation of the new gasket. The final step in Problem Analysis is Confirmation of the true cause. We are hoping to demonstrate, as closely as possible, the cause-and- effect relationship.

The confirmation is carried out in the work envi- ronment if possible. In our example, this can be done either by dupli- cating the effect suggested by the cause or by reversing the change suspected of having caused the problem to see if the problem stops. If no possible cause that has been generated passes the testing step, or if no cause that does pass it survives the confirmation step, the only re- course is to tighten up the prior work.

We may need more detailed infor- mation in the specification, in the ensuing identification of distinctions of the IS data, and in the identification of changes in and around the distinc- tions. This may lead to new insights, to the generation of new possible causes, and, finally, to a successful resolution. If we fail to find the true cause of a problem through these techniques, it is because we failed to gather and use information appropriately.

We cannot use information that we do not have. If we get the information but use it carelessly, the result may be no better. The logic of Problem Analysis defends conclusions that support facts; it sets aside those that cannot. It is a process that makes use of every bit of experience and judgment we possess; it helps us to use both in the most systematic and objective way possible.

Problem Analysis enables people to work together as a team, pooling their information in a common format, to determine the cause of a prob- lem. Most deviations are so complex that one person alone does not have the information necessary to find, test, and confirm the cause.

When all those who hold important data have a mechanism for integrating it, they can begin to find the unknown cause. Otherwise, that discovery may be stalled by misunderstandings and other barriers to communication. Some years ago, we asked a commanding general of a large United States Air Force base what results he had expected of the Kepner-Tregoe program, which had been installed throughout his command two years earlier.

In short, they were asking me to take responsibility for their actions—not, I believe, because they really wanted me to but because they thought they had to operate that way.

We expect you to use them. He believed this attitude would lead to a healthier and more productive organization. His tenure as commanding officer proved him right. He related an incident that had occurred about a month before our meet- ing. One Saturday a non-working day for top-level technical people , he had stopped in at the base to find some sixty of his staff carrying out a multi- faceted Problem Analysis.

They were trying to determine the cause of cracks in the walls of fighter aircraft engines. I had no idea the group had decided to spend their Saturday working on the problem.

It was their decision as a team. After asking a number of questions, he approved their recommendations and forwarded the analysis to the Pentagon. He strongly suggested that the analysis be accepted and the proposed course of action be adopted as soon as possible. Most applications of Problem Analysis result, to be sure, in less dra- matic conclusions. But the conditions that produced these particular con- clusions were typical of conditions that have always produced the best results: The people who carried out the analysis had been given systemat- ic problem-solving techniques.

They knew how to apply them to actual problems on their jobs. They were rewarded for making the effort. They were not afraid of failure. Chapter Two laid the groundwork for fully understanding the follow- ing examples of Problem Analysis in action.

The examples touch on four general subjects: Problem Analysis questioning at the managerial level. Abbreviated use of the process. Use of the techniques in a team situation. These are largely mechani- cal, tangible situations. At the management level, however, application of the process often consists of using the ideas of the process. Using the ideas includes dis- cussing the facts of a situation in all its dimensions rather than formulat- ing hypotheses based on experience.

Further, it is testing possible causes against the facts rather than immediately acting on the cause suggested by informed speculation.

Data may be recorded and notes taken, but use of the process by man- agers is usually observable in the character of the questioning and in the nature of the investigation. They are sharing information through the channels of a systematic process. The truth of the matter is that managers who become directly involved in problem solving are subject to criticism for failing to set priorities on their own time or to delegate appropriately—in short, for failing to manage their operations.

Managers need not have all the right answers. What is required of them are the ability and willingness to ask the right questions. The kind of questioning we use in specifying, in iden- tifying distinctions and changes, and in testing possible causes lends itself well to the process of assessing the logic and the contributions of others to resolving a problem.

A major bank in California had a number of branches in the Los Angeles area. The operating results of all branches are reviewed monthly by the Ex- ecutive Committee. At a July review, the Hawthorne branch showed a vol- ume of transactions slightly below plan. All the other branches were right on target or above. In August, the Hawthorne branch slipped a little further; in September, even more. In October, the news was worse yet. Members of the Executive Committee began an investigation.

He pointed out that when the decline in transactions was observed, the new branch manager had been in his position for about two months. He came in just before the branch started to slip. After a long discussion, the chairman sug- gested that they might be jumping to cause on the basis of a single fact.

The New Rational Manager

Despite some disagreement, they began an objective analysis. It was in Hawthorne alone that the decline was observed. And one is transferring a lot of its work from Hawthorne to Long Beach…. Atten- tion subsequently was focused on the new line of reasoning, supported by the efforts of at least one committee member to consider this as the cause of the problem. He made it possible for the discipline of Problem Analysis to absorb responsibility for producing a reasonable possible cause for the decline, one that could respond to all the facts surrounding it.

There was no loss of face nor was anyone blamed or fired for a situation that in no way could be termed mismanagement. It was simple to check the theory of local economic decline as the true cause of the problem: When did the volume first begin to fall off at Hawthorne? In early July. When did layoffs begin at the defense contractors?

In late May and early June. How long after a round of layoffs would the impact be felt in the bank?

No more than two or three weeks. How would the impact show up initially? By a reduction in deposits, then an increase in withdrawals. Confirmation consisted of a few hours of telephone research to check out the experience of other banks nearby.

The same story was told by all. There must be a willingness to ask all the questions needed to define a problem situation fully and to allow the facts surrounding that situation to speak for them- selves. Speculation is useful only to the extent that it is made within the structure of the process. On the other hand, speculation that overrides the structure or that is couched in the language but not the spirit of the process can be devastating.

Yet whoev- er controls the questioning and the assessment of that recommendation controls its management. But you would not like to be in the posi- tion of defending it to him if it were not strictly on the up-and-up. Concrete results arising from the combination of systematic techniques and technical expertise are the only things that will convince a manager that questions are as important as answers. An electronics manufacturing company is involved in the demanding task of producing miniaturized printed circuitry.

One day, the production quality fell off sharply and the number of rejected circuits skyrocketed. So temperatures were low- ered. A week later, when rejects climbed still higher, temperatures were raised, then lowered again, then systematically varied up and down for days.

Re- jects remained astronomical. So everything was scrubbed, polished, filtered, and wiped. The rejects dropped, then rose again. Acid concentration was the next idea. Same results. Water purity was checked out on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Rejects were still high. They might have remained high had one supervisor not begun to ask sys- tematic questions. This cast a different light on everything.

They focused on what might have been changed that bore a relationship to this timing. An immediate distinction was recognized: On each Monday, as soon as the tap was turned, water that had stood in the lines over the weekend came into the printed circuit leaching laboratories. The water used in the process had to go through intensive purification, since purity standards of a few parts per billion are required.

A quick search turned up the fact that some valves had been changed several months before. These valves used a silicone packing material. As water stood in the lines over the weekend, enough of this silicone packing material had begun to diffuse into the water to degrade the leaching process.

The result? Many rejections on Monday morning, fewer in the afternoon, and none after Tuesday noon. By then the contaminated water had been purged from the system. Regardless of the content of a problem, the search for specific and ac- curate answers demands specific and precise questions. In fact, the longer people use Problem Analysis, the more adept they become at singling out fragments of the process that apply to the kinds of problems they face every day. This is especially true of the abbreviated application of the process.

The seri- ousness of a problem does not necessarily determine the length or com- plexity of the analysis required to resolve it. Some extremely serious problems have been solved through abbreviated uses of the process. They were so data-poor that full use could not be undertaken. Fragments of the process had to be relied on and combined with educated speculation to arrive at a most likely cause.

Apollo XIII was on its way to the moon. Fifty-four hours and fifty-two min- utes into the mission—, miles from Earth—and all was well.

Then John L. Swigert, Jr. A moment later the power came up again. Swigert reported: And we had a pretty large bang associated with the caution and warning there. Main B is reading zip right now. A disaster had occurred in space and no one was sure what had happened. They began to build a specification of the deviation from the information that came in answer to their questions and from data displayed on their monitoring equipment.

At the same time they started a number of contingency actions to reduce use of electrical power on board Apollo XIII. Thirteen minutes after the first report, Swigert reported: Since oxygen was used in the generation of electricity as well as directly in life-support systems, the situation could hardly be more serious.

Further actions were taken to conserve both oxygen and electricity. In the end it was determined that the Number Two Tank had burst and vented all its oxygen, plus a large portion of the gas from the Number One Tank, through a damaged valve and out into space. The three men returned successfully to Earth but only by the narrowest of margins. Had the cause remained unknown for very much longer, they would not have had enough oxygen left to survive. It was weeks before the root cause of this problem was established through on-the-ground testing and experimentation.

Two weeks before the launch, a ground crew had piped liquid oxygen into the tanks in a countdown demonstration. After the test they had had difficulty getting the oxygen out of the Number Two Tank.

They had activated a heater in- side the tank to vaporize some of the liquid oxygen, thus providing pres- sure to force it out. Although a protective switch was pro- vided to turn off the heater before it became too hot, the switch was fused in the ON position because the ground crew had connected it to a volt power supply instead of the volt supply used in Apollo XIII.

Later, in flight, the crew turned the heater on briefly to get an accurate quantity reading. The fused switch created an arc that overheated the oxygen in the tank, raised the internal pressure tremendously, and blew the dome and much of the connecting piping off into space.

They knew which fuel cells were inoperative when Swigert reported that the Number Two Tank was reading zero. They tested the cause—that the Number Two Tank had ruptured—and found that this would explain the suddenness and totality described in the specification. More importantly, it explained a sudden, total failure within the system. They had unbounded faith in Apollo equipment, knowing that it was the best that could be devised.

The idea of an oxygen tank bursting open in the depths of space was not credible. All this was justified from their ex- perience. Without the bungling that had occurred on the ground two weeks before the launch, the tank would have gone to the moon and back just as it was designed and built to do.

In fact, they proved this cause in record time. In a case such as this, Problem Analysis is rendered difficult by two factors: Sudden failure in a complex system usually causes other deviations that may obscure the original deviation. The shock of a sudden failure often precipitates panic, making a careful review and use of the facts even more difficult.

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A disciplined and system- atic investigation is difficult in any case, but discipline becomes essential when a top-speed search for cause is undertaken and there is no possibili- ty of amassing all the data that would be optimal in the investigation. In the NASA incident, the presence of a systematic approach enabled a team of people to work together as a single unit, even though they were sepa- rated from the deviation by nearly a quarter of a million miles.

Another common motivator for shortcut Problem Analysis is expediency. It may simply be unnecessary to go into the full process in order to explain the deviation.

If this possible cause can quickly be confirmed as the true cause, all the better. A large city in California bought new spray equipment for painting white- and-yellow lines on roads.

From the beginning the equipment gave the oper- ators trouble, even though no new procedures had been introduced. No critical change existed. The equipment was brand new.

It was cleaned with solvent before being taken out on the job. After a short period of operation, the spray nozzles plugged up. Within minutes the nozzles plugged up again.

A Problem Analysis was begun. The problem was specified. Not the new paint sprayer. ST was introduced and the new sprayer worked perfectly. If a possible cause leaps to mind two minutes into the specification and can be confirmed easily and quickly as the true cause, then that is the best use of the process for that situation.

For example, distinctions and changes re- lated to the timing of the problem may be studied intensively to the exclu- sion of everything else. One of our clients produces cattle feed with soybean meal as an essential ingredient. Soybeans contain urease, an enzyme that reacts with urea to form ammonia. The Undoing Project: Michael Lewis.

Jordan B. The Power of Habit. Charles Duhigg. Mark Manson. Homo Deus. Yuval Noah Harari. A Clash of Kings. Susan Cain. David and Goliath. Malcolm Gladwell. Hans Rosling. Smarter Faster Better. Elon Musk. Ashlee Vance. Fire and Fury. Michael Wolff. Enlightenment Now. Steven Pinker. The Hunger Games Trilogy. Suzanne Collins.

Never Split the Difference. Chris Voss. Ray Dalio. A Game of Thrones.

Travels in the New Third World. Those in Peril. Wilbur Smith. When Breath Becomes Air. Paul Kalanithi. Astrophysics for People in a Hurry. Neil deGrasse Tyson. Laura Vanderkam. Tools of Titans. Timothy Ferriss.


Deep Work. Cal Newport.

The Signal and the Noise. Nate Silver. Think Like a Freak. Steven D. Friedrich Nietzsche. Why We Sleep. Matthew Walker. Rich Dad Poor Dad. Robert T. Hillbilly Elegy. Skin in the Game. Nassim Nicholas Taleb. Steve Jobs. Walter Isaacson. Adam Grant.

Hearts at Stake. Alyxandra Harvey. Shoe Dog. Phil Knight. Option B.

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