Ensiklopedi hukum pidana Islam by Abdul Qadir Audah, , Kharisma Ilmu edition, in Indonesian - Ed. Indonesia. Ensiklopedi hukum pidana Islam, Volume 1. Front Cover. Abdul Qadir Audah. Kharisma Ilmu, - Criminal law (Islamic law) · 0 Reviews. Encyclopedia on. Available in the National Library of Australia collection. Author: Mubarok, Jaih; Format: Book; xx, p. ; 21 cm.
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48 Redefining Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia's priorities 50 Pan-Islamism and with a strong legal infrastructure, including a criminal code, the Hukum pidana. . 93 Panitya Buku Peringatan Muhammad Natsir, Muhammad Natsir 70 tahun. Edition/Format: eBook: Document: Indonesian: Cet. 1View all editions and formats Pemikiran hukum pidana Islam kontemporer / oleh Makhrus Munajat aracer.mobi com//02/18/gratifikasi-kriminalitas-seksual-dalam-hukum-pidana-islam/ .
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Need help? How do I find a book? Can I borrow this item? Can I get a copy? Can I view this online? Ask a librarian. Advances in seafaring greatly increased the numbers of Jawi vis- iting the holy places of Islam. Jawi, the collective name used in the Middle East to describe Southeast Asian Muslims, had been under- taking the journey to the Arabian Peninsula for centuries, and by the late s Jawi constituted the largest group of pilgrims.
Van Hoeve, , Chap- ter 2. This is still the most exhaustive treatment of the Ethical Policy and the formation of an indigenous intelligentsia in the early twentieth century. Specifically on Ethici and Islam, see Laf- fan, Islamic nationhood.
Cambridge Univer- sity Press, , p. For centuries Mecca had been the destination par excellence for religious studies when, at the turn of the twentieth century, Cairo made its appearance on the map of Islamic learning. In there were only twelve Jawi in Cairo,6 in there were roughly fifty or sixty Indonesians, and by more than two hundred Southeast Asian students were living in the Egyptian capital.
Islamic and other visions c. NUS, , pp. It is important to keep in mind that they all had key roles in shaping Islamic views in Indonesia in the ss, and substantially interacted with Karto- suwiryo. As Persis gathered most of the religious-oriented nationalist intelligentsia in Bandung, Ahmad Hassan soon became a close friend and peer of Kartosuwiryo.
But as soon as June Karto- suwiryo delivered his first speech in Sundanese. This kind of institution had existed since for the children of natives employed within the colonial administration. Classes were taught in both Malay and Dutch, and attendance gave its pupils access to Dutch secondary schools.
Attending this school was considered a high privilege, as here European and high-status native pupils sat in the same classes. What is known is that he attended the medical school until , when he was expelled under uncertain circum- stances, possibly for his involvement with communism. This was not the only time Kartosuwiryo would be linked to communism, as vari- ous accusations were made throughout the ss.
All translations from Indonesian and Dutch languages are my own. Badan Penerbit Aryaguna, , pp. Others have argued that Kar- tosuwiryo used religion as nothing more than a thin veil masking his ambition for political power.
These repre- sentations are addressed later in this chapter to further illustrate his leadership patterns, and then again in the last chapter of this book. Surabaya By the early twentieth century, Surabaya had become one of the major cities in Java — and, by default, of the Indonesian archi- pelago.
Between and , Surabaya underwent a sudden increase in industrial employment, with colonial statistics suggest- ing that by there were at least ten thousand workers employed in industrial establishments across the city and its residency. World War I pushed the colony to change its production patterns, and the manufacturing of materials that had typically been destined for the export market — like sugar, tobacco and textiles — was largely replaced by the metallurgical, machinery and building-materi- als sectors.
All told, these industries employed around twenty to twenty-five thousand workers in Marco was an early member of the reformist movement, who soon shifted from pan-Islamism to communism. It must be mentioned, though, that between and — the years that Kartosuwiryo spent in Sura- baya — Marco was first based in Surakarta; then, after the communist revolts, he was exiled to the Boven Digoel prison, from which he never returned Shiraishi, An age in motion, pp.
This timeline indicates that Kartosuwiryo could have not possibly been living with Marco. Ohio University Press, , pp. Together with Boedi Oetomo, Sarekat Islam constituted the groundings for the anti-colonial movement. Though Boedi Oetomo is generally con- sidered the first nationalist organization in the Indies, the group had originally been an association advancing Javanese cultural val- ues.
For the colonial establish- ment, this advancement was to be achieved through education and integration into the administrative system. For some local aristo- crats, progress involved the promotion of ethnic culture and val- ues. For others, especially those who in the long run would become advocates of the nationalist movement, mobilization was aimed at social and political change.
Penerbit Djambatan, , pp. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo was of a similar mind. However, their efforts to transform Boedi Oetomo into a socialist party dedicated to improv- ing the masses failed, as they found the Boedi Oetomo environ- ment too entrenched in Javanese aristocratic values. Tirto and Tjipto then took separate paths in their common efforts.
It originated as an organiza- tion whose main stated aim was the economic protection of Muslim batik traders against the powerful Chinese textile industry. From a mixed santri-priyai background, Tjokroaminoto succeeded in reaching farmers, coolies and intellectuals alike, addressing issues of social and economic inequality as well as pointing to Islam as the foundation of society.
Tjokroaminoto assumed leadership in and retained it until his death in As long as Tjokroaminoto led the group, Sarekat Islam was primarily concerned with advancing the socio- economic conditions of the widely exploited Javanese peasantry. Pelopor nasionalisme Indonesia, Jakarta: Yayasan Kebangkitan Insan Cendekia, , pp. Benda, The crescent and the rising sun, p. Community and identity in the Netherlands East Indies, Ithaca: Charisma and political strategy allowed Tjokroaminoto to attract those elite factions concerned with the economic and social conditions of the Indies, as well as the disaffected masses.
Hidup dan perdjuangannja Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, , vol. In the early s, the party was increasingly Islamized. The activities of the Khilafat movement in India had stirred admiration across the Muslim world in general, and in Java in particular, such that in the al-Islam Congress in Yogyakarta decided that an envoy would be sent to India to establish relations with the Central Khilafat Committee.
In , Sarekat Islam party leaders had already established a Central Comite Chilafat in Sura- baya, and later that year the same city hosted the al-Islam Congress to discuss how to approach the Caliphate question. As the Middle East was hit by the internal dismantling of the caliphal institution and the external fragmentation of the Otto- man Empire, pan-Islamism was also losing support in favour of pan-Arabism and nationalism. Hadji Agoes Salim first asserted the centrality of religion as the founding principle of Sarekat Islam with the establishment of the al-Islam Congress in Tjokroaminoto, pp.
Nijhoff, ; and S. Oliver-Dee, The Caliphate question: Lexington Books, I suggest that the Indonesian nationalist movement emerged as a result of a transformation that took place in the s. Accepting the fact that the first organiza- tions to advocate independence from colonial rule were Boedi Oetomo and Sarekat Dagang Islam, I argue that the nationalist movement emerged from fractures within, and reorganizations of, these two groups, a reshaping that occurred along ideological lines.
Sarekat Islam had split into a socialist and an Islamic wing in the mid s. In following years, the caliphate issue, the Islamic state ideal and the pan-Islamic project would quickly become important elements in rallying support among the Indies Muslims, and in further widening the chasm between the various groups. The case for independence from colonial rule as part of a transnational religious movement was made even stronger by the argument that striving for the unity of the ummah was a religious duty.
The abrogation of the Caliphate, together with the Saudi con- quest of Mecca in the Arabian Peninsula and the already heated Palestinian question, dominated political debates in Indonesia as in other Muslim countries.
Scholars of colonial Indonesia have argued that by the mid s, political Islam in the Dutch East Indies was in steep decline, with communism and secular nationalism taking its place among the indigenous population.
However, by March he was in Batavia, dedicating much of his time to Sarekat Islam activities. Tjokroaminoto, p. Geheime Mailrapporten [hereafter GMr], no. These were the Cianjur open meeting and the al-Islam Congress. While the for- mer was a local event,33 the latter involved delegates represent- ing more than forty branches across Java. As Salim had requested at the congress in Pekalongan,34 Salim and Tjokroaminoto established the Majelis Oelama Assembly of Islamic Scholars as an institution representing the ulil amri as a form of Islamic consul- tative and judicial authority.
On this occasion, representatives from several youth organizations and newspapers — including Jong Java, Jong Batak Bond, Jong Islami- eten Bond, and the Chinese daily Keng Po — issued a pledge, the Sumpah Pemuda, affirming their commitment to the establishment of an Indonesian nation in which the unity of the homeland would prevail over different ethnic and linguistic communities. The Sumpah Pemuda was a milestone on the road towards the forma- tion of a politically conscious youth and future political elite who were attempting to articulate an anti-colonial discourse in terms broader than ethnicity or religion.
The conclusion of the pledge, signed by Kartosuwiryo and others, stated: He later reported on Fadjar Asia that this writer, as a child of Indonesia, and especially as a child of Indo- nesia who embraces Islam, meaning the religion of the Indonesian nation kebangsaan Indonesia , [reminds you] that because this is the religion embraced by a large part of the Indonesian people in general, and also the religion that functions as a bond between several groups and peoples that have settled in our homeland Indo- nesia, it is because of that that it is appropriate and not far from the truth to say that if in this meeting [the Youth Congress] we want to talk, our opinions should be exclusively based on Islam and Islamization.
To this statement, Kartosuwiryo answered: Latar sejarah dan pengaruh- nya bagi pergerakan nasional Jakarta: Kementerian Kebudayaan dan Pariwisata Indonesia, , pp. Kartosuwirjo dan Daud Beureueh, 2nd ed. Sega Arsy, , p. I have not seen the original document. As Kartosuwiryo was gaining attention on the political scene, his statements became part of journalistic debates, as Darmokondo, Bintang Timoer and Oetoesan Hindia often reacted to his writings. In the absence of the West Java chairman, Abdoel- moetallib Sangadji, the congress was opened by Tjokroaminoto and Kadar, who was president of the Jakarta branch, and was chaired by Aroedji Kartawinata, the director of the PSII school in Garut who in the s would become a military commander in the Tasikma- laya area.
The content of the articles and the nature of the dispute are analysed in the last section of this chapter. The congress was held on August The most notable absentee was, in fact, Muhammadiyah. The absence of such debates in Indonesia, Nur Ichwan continues, should then not be seen as a deviation from Islamic modernist thought, but rather as a practical implication of the fact that most Muslims did not speak Arabic.
Beginning with a complaint about the contamination of water- ways, which had caused the death by malaria of about 90 people in the Cianjur area, Kartosuwiryo then swiftly moved to criticize the granting of agricultural land to Indo-Europeans at advantageous premiums. Kartosuwiryo pointed to local and national implications of these policies: Gatot Mangkoepradja and Soekarno delivered their speeches in Malay rather than Sundanese, and the content — as well as the medium — shows how PNI gatherings would usually address an urban audience.
They focused on the Russo-Japanese war, labour workers, and the necessity of overcoming differences in the name of cooperation. It is only in looking at the political milieu of these congresses that we can understand the balancing act attempted by Tjokroaminoto, who in his concluding speech mentioned the evils of imperialism and capitalism, comparing them to Gog and Magog, at the same time invoking the blessing of the One and Only God.
At the aftermath of this congress, Kartosuwiryo spent some time in West Java, and between August and October , he often visited the Priangan region to represent the central execu- tive committee. Another aspect of Dutch policies mentioned in his speech is colonial expan- sion through religion, land and trade. In August he established the Taman Marsoedi Kasoesastran, an educational institution that held classes on subjects ranging from science and English to Dutch and Arabic, and which also had a bookshop.
These two elements played an impor- tant role in transforming Kartosuwiryo into a bearer of traditional authority in the years that followed, as well as in the deepening of his own religious knowledge. Reportedly, Kartosuwiryo used to spend long hours with local kiyai, among whom were party leaders Moestafa Kamil and Joesoef Taoeziri, mentioned above. Upon his return to Garut, Moestafa Kamil joined the ranks of the local branch and soon became a prominent political figure who was also often imprisoned by the colonial police.
Joesoef Taoeziri died , too, was renowned for his religious knowledge and was among the early members of the Sarekat Islam branch in Ciparay. Where these two politicians differed was in their approach to Islamic poli- tics during the Japanese occupation.
This seemed to happen quite often. Essays on the role of religion in Asia Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, ; William A. Taoeziri, on the other hand, rejected military intervention and established his own school in Ciparay, pesantren Daroel Salam Abode of Peace , dedi- cating his full attention to teaching. By marrying his daughter, Kartosuwiryo strengthened his political standing in Sarekat Islam and gained a position within tra- ditional patterns of authority.
In the s, Karl Jackson argued that Darul Islam followers joined in the rebellion because of networks of authority. Kern, 9 June , p. Pergulatan pemikiran kiai dan ulama di Jawa Barat, Yogyakarta: MataBangsa, , p.
Jackson, Traditional authority and national integration: University of California Press, . His argument is fur- ther analysed in the concluding chapter to this book. Herlina Lubis develops her argument from the observation that Priangan society displayed several examples in which the link between local aristocracy and Islam is embodied in members of the menak group who were also ulama, as in the cases of Hadji Hasan Moestafa of Garut and Raden Hadji Moehammad Moesa The kaum menak obtained religious legitimation by closely aligning their social and political life with Islamic values and institu- tions.
For example, they often attended and sponsored the build- ing of pesantren, thereby creating strong bonds with local ulama. A body of legends claiming that kaum menak families descended from the Sultan of Pajang — an extension of the Demak Sultanate in sixteenth-century Java — or from Prabu Siliwangi of Pajajaran — the pre-Islamic Sundanese Empire — also served to further strengthen their connections with traditional religious and political authority.
Nonetheless, among these ulama-bupati aristocrats there was still a strong tendency towards orthodoxy and towards the implementation of sharia law. In his first biography, published in , just one year after his capture and execution, Kartosuwiryo was presented as having a com- plex character. Oth- ers claimed that he had received the wahyu Cakraningrat Sadar, which among all the wahyu is the only one bestowed upon kings, and that he had been invested with the title of Kalifatullah seluruh ummat manusia, or representative of God to the entire Islamic community.
It was said that he owned amulets jimat that protected him even from bullets, as well as a keris and a cundrik a small keris with a straight blade. Put simply, his followers deemed him to have sakti divine power. To several of his followers he once admitted to be the reincarnation of Raden Patah, one of the most famous men of religion and the first sultan of Demak, the first Sultanate of Java.
He told his devotees that for long he had desired to establish the NII [Negara Islam Indonesia] and that only he could become the leader, or imam, because he had been predestined for that by God […] Kartosuwiryo once said he had received the wahyu Cakraningrat Sadar from God, this was like a beam of bright light from the sky down onto him.
Nancy Florida describes Joyoboyo texts as follows: History as prophecy in colonial Java Durham, NC: Duke University Press, , p. Grip, , pp. This text contains several biographical mistakes; nonetheless, it is still worth discussing its approach to the character of Kartosuwiryo. At the same time, his rationality was so developed that his objective critical capacity was dominant, and it has become representative of his thinking and actions. His mystical activities were neither essential nor fundamental to him, and he approached them in a critical way.
So the mystical path that he might have expe- rienced was maybe something meaningful on a personal level. His mystical activities — the little available news on these — were used as a tool to strengthen the implementation of his ideas. Thus, he used mysticism as a tool neither essential nor crucial to him, but rather as an element of authority in the face of the masses he led.
Horikoshi ultimately con- cludes that Kartosuwiryo succeeded in gathering support as a result of the combination of military-political circumstances, Islamic poli- tics, and personal characteristics: Kartosuwiryo di Jawa Barat Bandung: Such a charismatic man inspires awe segan in his followers.
In rural Java high causes have traditionally been based on the values of communal peace, prosperity, and social justice, and expressed either in indigenous Ratu Adil or Islamic Imam Mahdi idioms. I further address this point in the concluding chapter of this book. In April Kartosuwiryo lamented that in politics, economics, but also society, the world still searches and gropes in the dark.
Hun- dreds of thousands of traders and businessmen fail in their trades.
The examples he produced were from Russia, China, and France, but his heart and mind were in Sukabumi, where taxes and the cost of living had increased to the point that local farmers were forced to sell their land to pay current expenses, and then to rent back smaller pieces of their own sawah paddy field to sustain their families. In addition to focusing on the constant economic harassment by the colonial administration at the local and national levels, Kartosuwiryo dedicates considerable attention to police intrusions at political activities and religious gatherings.
Sarekat Islam party members were jailed, party cadres questioned and prayer sessions broken up with little apparent reason other than creating difficulties for the gerakan, in the rural areas as much as in Batavia. Its past, its people, its problems, Paul Tickell ed.
Monash University, Hence, religion is political. Colonial politics itself is founded on religion, especially the Christian religion; there is a policy named Kersteningspolitiek, aimed at Christianizing the Indonesian popula- tion.
Hence, religion is an important factor in colonial politics. Upon hearing this statement, the modern Muslim, who works for the Dutch administration, is easily convinced and sets aside the common, secular understanding of religion as a private matter. He replies: Achieving indepen- dence, however, is not important for its own sake, but rather for the sake of creating an environment favourable to the implementa- tion of Islamic laws and the establishment of a government based on Islam.
Hold on to the ties connecting the Islamic ummah! Hold on to Islam truly! Follow the orders of Allah, and stay away from that which He forbids. Clearly this is the noble way to obtain freedom for the peo- ple and the motherland in a more encompassing and true sense, liberated from all forms of slavery, humiliation and subjugation, which are still now affecting us Indonesians in general and Muslims in particular.
In short: On Islamic understanding, the government must be neutraal. Never make a comment on the Caliphate question, especially on pan- Islamism […], educate Indonesian children, and give them classes on all subjects but religion […], seek friendship between Holland and Indonesia on matters of politics and nationalism, but do not envisage friendship in religion.
It is along these lines that Kartosuwiryo argued in favour of the use of Malay for intellectuals and nationalist leaders. For Kartosuwiryo, neither attitude made sense, nor could either lead to success. Instead they have… science, intelligence, and whatever else. Soeara baroe! For the first two years Sarekat Islam argued that PPPKI was just a federation of parties and not a union persatuan , and therefore allowed participating organizations to maintain their autonomy.
In March , however, Sarekat Islam took a stronger position against PPPKI and its attitude of cooperation with the colonial authorities a point further discussed in the next chapter , and it gradually distanced itself from the federation. Fadjar Asia responded to this accusation by explaining that the decision had been made on financial grounds. As Tjokroaminoto had already pointed out in his Islam dan sosialisme, socialism and Islamism both relied on international networks for the achievement of their socio-political goals.
Even though it might appear to conflict with the nationalist objectives of the Sarekat Islam party, what follows shows that the shifts between Islamic nationalism and pan-Islamic transnational- ism cannot be understood apart from their historical contingen- cies, an approach that I also apply to understanding this same phenomenon in the ss period. See also PPO, August , p. Arguing for the primacy of Islam, Kartosuwiryo pointed to the socio-political dimensions of the hajj pilgrimage as a physi- cal manifestation of Islamic brotherhood, crossing boundaries of ethnicity, language and nationality.
I am not suggesting that Sarekat Islam was instrumentalizing pan-Islamism as an element of its political propaganda, but rather that the idea of a global community united by the same religious beliefs and striving for the same freedom from foreign domina- tion was considered a powerful rallying point for political action.
It would only be in the s that Kartosuwiryo developed a vision of pan-Islamism as the final goal of his struggle. This he would repre- sent as the creation of a transnational political entity, namely, a state based on Islamic laws that unified the ummah worldwide. Despite the existence of several secular political parties that claimed to be inter-Asiatic, Kartosuwiryo believed that only Islam called for pure and genuine cooperation across borders, untainted by political opportunism.
Showing how difficult it was to balance nationalism and pan- Islamism intellectually, Kartosuwiryo added that an additional function of Islamic internationalism — which he also referred to as inter-Islamism — was the creation of a network of Islamic countries that desired to cooperate with one another on the road to nationalism. But this polemic, instead of harming the Islamic faction, became an ideal platform for Fadjar Asia to further enlighten its readership about the political duties of Muslims.
But for Kartosuwiryo and the PSII, kebangsaan was not to be linked to worldly desires nor was it limited by any territorial boundary. It was wide and broad, and connected only to religious affiliation and to the unity of Islam: Islamic nationalism was solely committed to the prosperity of God. He soon gained the attention of authorities for his work as a journalist and the atten- tion of Tjokroaminoto for his political engagement.
And while the former accused him of fanaticism, the latter reared him as a god- son. Exposed to international dynamics originating both in Europe and the Middle East, regional and ethnic cultural organizations were transformed into political parties that were increasingly defined by their founding ideologies.
As the Dutch curbed political activities, the anti-colonial front became increasingly fragmented, with each party further radicalizing its position. So, we stand outside, we are not staying silent!! The Great Depression that hit the West inevitably reached the colonies, stalling exports of manufactured goods and crop production.
Schools were producing thousands of unemployable graduates, and trained clerks were forced to take up menial jobs, while older employees were fired to make room for younger cheaper workers. Nonetheless, in urban Java real wages increased, socio-economic conditions were no worse than usual and the general economic distress did not stir political discontent, much to the surprise of colonial authorities and nationalist leaders alike.
Zentgraff; see Hering, Soekarno: Founding father, pp. Even as Japan took over Java and Sumatra in , effectuating major changes in the independence movement, the two groups were to remain separated, each with its own ideological and strategic concerns. Kartosuwiryo began travelling across the region on propaganda tours in May.
This meeting was attended by some 3, people, and Kartosuwiryo delivered his speech directly in Sundanese, an indica- tion that he had already spent some time in West Java. On 10 June , he addressed the party constituency in Cilame on the right to assembly for Friday prayers, and on 14 June he was in Leles at the local MOI meeting. Pinardi, Sekarmadji Maridjan, p. The party board was represented by Tjokroami- noto, Salim, Soerjopranoto, K. Major points of discussion at this congress were hereditary property, the poenale sanctie and guru ordonnantie, as well as opium consumption, prostitution and gambling; these issues were specifically mentioned in an action programme released on this occasion and named programma van actie jihad.
The call for jihad is further investigated in Chapter 3. The congress was held between 16 and 22 March This committee was also charged with tackling the anti-Islamic feelings that had sur- faced in secular circles. The statute was edited between October and January KVG no. Neither of these meet- ings made any progress in connecting Muslims in the Indies with the rest of the ummah. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to see the significance of these committees in the s in this same light.
Attempts to recreate a global caliphate had long since been abandoned, and even in the British Indies, where the Khilafat movement was more persistent and dedicated, the focus and priorities of the movement had shifted away from the caliphate and towards nationalism. On the one hand, there was opposition to secular nationalism and commitment to religiously informed politics; on the other hand, there was the issue of non- cooperation.
Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia had thus begun shaping itself along these two projects of Islamic politics and non- cooperation. However, as political winds in the Indies changed, this redefinition had to be halted. Landau, The politics of pan-Islam: Ideology and organisation Oxford: Historical memory and contemporary contexts London: Hurst Publishers; New York: Columbia University Press, a , pp. The same holds true also for the secularists. When Soekarno was released from prison in December , Soetan Sjahrir and Mohammad Hatta had already returned from the Netherlands, and Sartono was holding tight his leadership of Partindo.
The congress was held between 25 and 27 December Java, the Dutch, and the cultivation system Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, On the first count, Hatta, Sjahrir and the new PNI believed in forming highly educated and intellectualized cadres, whilst Partindo and Soekarno focused on stirring mass agitation. On the second count, Hatta and Soekarno differed on the issue of cooperation: The arrest of Soekarno was followed by those of Hatta and Sjah- rir in February Soekarno — probably in exchange for soften- ing his political rhetoric — was sent to Flores, but the more radical Hatta and Sjahrir were exiled to Digul until the Japanese invasion of Java and Sumatra in Wilson ed.
Indonesian voices of colonial days Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, , p. Cornell University Press, , Chapter 4. Because of the electoral policies implemented, however, the coun- cil was not representative of the indigenous population, nor did it have any decision-making powers. In the council was trans- formed into a semi-legislative body, and in for the first time European members were the minority. Yet, their grudging support for the councils did not translate into their support for gradual reforms.
The Soetardjo petition of requested a conference to discuss the possibility of autonomy from the Netherlands. However, not only did the petition fail to gather the votes of the nationalist movement as this proposal had emerged from a moderate and assorted group , but it was also rejected by the Dutch government in November Since the composition of the Volksraad had been half Dutch and half Indonesian, with one third of its members nominated, and the rest elected from amongst the civil servants.
Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications,  , pp. For one, it resulted in radical changes in the PSII party leadership. The first purge occurred in March , when Soekiman — at that point vice-president of the executive committee — and Surjopranoto — leading member of the dewan partij — were expelled. Under the guidance of Agoes Salim, for example, it established a commission to solve the conflict between traditional adat and Islamic law. The commission suggested the replacement of adat with sharia, with particular attention to the realm of family law, a motion strongly backed by Tjokroaminoto at the congress, just a few months before his passing.
Kartosuwiryo, Salim and Abikoesno now led the directorate and took charge of the transition. The congress was held between 20 and 26 May Salim also asked permis- sion to re-join the Volksraad, where he had been a member from to Salim was ousted, and by the time the party convened for the Jakarta congress, the leadership had already been changed.
The dewan partij was presided over by Wondoamiseno and Kartosuwiryo, who had brought along several members from the West Java branch to fill positions in the executive committee. The congress was held in Jakarta between 8 and 12 July Salim was followed by Sangadji, Mohammed Roem and Wibisono, amongst others.
The 21 branches were: In early January the provincial congress of Sulawesi, in Gorontalo, had issued a press release voicing its disappointment over the hijrah policy.
The 23rd congress was held between 19 and 23 July. The old PNI, at the height of its popularity, gathered 10, support- ers. Parindra, instead, jumped from 3, in to 19, in These limitations were seen as yet another means to con- trol the indigenous population and their religious affairs, as they revoked the relative autonomy granted to Islamic courts since in family- and inheritance-related matters. More importantly, the motion prohibited PSII members from making use of the Landraad, the colonial civil courts set up for indigenous Indonesians.
Kartosuwiryo also blamed the community for referring to the colonial authorities rather than to local leaders when seeking solutions to their daily problems. Kartosuwiryo, voicing his disapproval of this system, returned to these issues at the first MIAI al-Islam con- gress, held in February This federation of Islamic organiza- tions, modernist and traditionalist alike, had been established in September with the aim of forming an Indonesian parliament based on Islamic legislation,42 possibly as a reaction to the Soetardjo petition of Using his vigorous oratorical skills, Kartosuwiryo, representing PSII, tackled the problem of implementing Islamic law from two sides: Latif and 2nd Secretaris H.
Darul Falah, , pp. To realize the pan-Islamic project was as important as the Islamization of Indonesian politics as opposed to its Westernization , the education of Indonesian Muslims or the establishment of contacts with other Muslim communities outside of the archipelago.
Throughout most of the first part, the discussion does not stray from standard theological teachings. The congress was held between 30 July and 7 August In short, all the rules needed for internal and external con- duct can be found in Islam, from the smallest to the biggest.
As humans can be divided into three categories depending on their proximity to God, so can the history of PSII be organized in this same way: As Muhammad and his followers had left Mecca and migrated to ensure the supremacy of justice over evil, and of monotheism over polytheism, so Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia had to seek hap- piness falah and victory fatah by pursuing its own hijrah and starting a new era.
Above all, the hijrah to Medina-Indonesia — and hence to an Islamic state — is marked by three steps: However, it would be erroneous to consider developments in Indonesia in isolation from events occurring in the Middle East. I will explore this point further in the next section. Politically it calls for Islamic politics; economically, for cooperatives and self- reliance for which Kartosuwiryo uses the Indian term swadeshi ; and socially, for the benefit of public interest maslaha.
Esposito, Un-holy war: Terror in the name of Islam Oxford: Oxford University Press, , pp. The Daftar oesaha hidjrah, printed in , complemented the Sikap hidjrah by illustrating the anticipated Program djihad partij.
Weaving together the threads laid out in the past decade, Kartosuwiryo argued that PSII should direct its efforts towards improving the status of the Indo- nesian population meaning the natives by expanding the reach of the dar-ul-Islam and thus widening the constituency of the Mus- lim society. I also showed that debates within Sarekat Islam often touched upon issues involving the wider Muslim world.
The mistake al-ittihad-oel-Islam instead of ittihad-oel-Islam or al-ittihad- oel-Islamiyah might indicate a low level of familiarity with Arabic, or even an over-correction. It is worth noting that C. Van Nieuwenhuijze defined their enquiries as an interest supported by a good deal of rather detailed information, it seemed. In fact, would it not be surprising if no relations existed between movements, each so well settled — even though not legally — in its own society?
Panitia Pembela Indonesia. It appears that Hasan al-Banna participated in its establishment, together with other Brotherhood leaders and the Palestinian leader Muhammad Ali Taher in October Federspiel, Islam and ideology in the emerging Indonesian state: The Persatuan Islam Persis , Leiden: Brill, , p. Van Hoeve, , p. Nijhoff, , p. As explained below, this has a wide range of meanings.
Though the use of this word has been increasingly common in Islamist circles since the s, it had not been present in the Indonesian context in the preceding decades, leading scholars to believe that it had been introduced only during the Islamic revival period.
I have, however, encountered the term on several occa- sions, from this article to the Sikap hidjrah pamphlet, and the Soeara MIAI magazine during the Japanese occupation. Yet, just one year later, he would be expelled from the party, mostly as a result of his non- cooperationist approach.
It was suspected that these teach- ings had spread across the region, and mass expulsions were led in Garut and beyond. However, as Soetomo died in May , the leadership shifted to Thamrin. Indonesian nationalists and the Dutch, None of the sources explain which elements of the Sikap hidjrah pamphlet indicated an alignment with the tarekat movement, and I could not detect any such indications from my reading of the text.
This statement is, however, left unexplored by the sources. In his report, Statius Muller also made a note about an educa- tional institution, the Soeffah.
In Medina, the Prophet used to expound Islamic teachings in a sheltered corner of the mosque in Arabic called suffah , which at night also functioned as makeshift home for the newly arrived migrants, the muhajirin. Exiled nationalist leaders returned to the centre of the strug- gle, boundaries between cooperationists and non-cooperationists shifted, and the Japanese-led mobilization of the Indonesian popu- lation all had consequences for the nationalist movement.
Though at first Japan had promoted the religious wing of the nationalist movement, by the time Japan capitulated, Soekarno and the secu- larists had gained the upper hand. As short-lived as it was, the Japanese occupation was a forma- tive experience for the Indonesian political leadership, as it gave a structure to what until then had been just hopes, dreams and visions of an independent state.
These two trajectories led, first, to the unintentional politicization of the rural population, as traditional structures of power were replaced by new organizations whose leadership was entrusted to physically strong, administratively able and highly cooperative youth. The first such organization was the Gerakan Tiga A, which hailed Japan as leader, protector and light of Asia. The group was established within weeks from the Japanese arrival, as early as April As all pre-invasion organizations and parties had been abolished, the Triple A Movement was to include members of both nationalist parties and government officials without dis- tinction.
The first sign that Japan was not going to sideline, but instead would emphasize, the role of the Muslim leadership was the formation of an Islamic sub-division of the Triple A Movement, the Persiapan Persatoean Oemmat Islam Preparation of the Uni- fication of the Islamic Community , entrusted to Abikoesno in July Martinus Nijhoff, ; Benda, The crescent and the rising sun.
For additional details on the bureaucratic transition, see Shigeru Sato, War, nationalism, and peasants: Anderson, Java in a time of revolution: Cornell University Press, , pp. Rijksuniversiteit Instituut voor Geschiedenis, , pp. There was no reason to upset the new regime, argued Wondo- amiseno, as it seemed committed to strengthening the Islamic movement by providing it with a united organization.
Until then Sarekat Islam was to focus on education tabligh and economic initiatives. Putera brought together all political and non-political nationalist organizations to work towards establishing a form of self-government.
Although in the hands of secular nationalists - its directorate included Soekarno, Hatta, and Ki Hadjar Dewantoro of the Taman Siswa - Putera also gave a leading role to the former chairman of Muhammadiyah K. Mas Mansur. Also very interesting are the archives containing the registration modules of participating kiyai. These offer extensive information on their family history and education, and often also on the titles of the texts studied and taught.
Returning to journalism, he became a regular contributor to the bi-weekly magazine Soeara MIAI from its inception in March until it dissolved at the end of the same year. Indonesian Muslims had to persevere in their belief in the afterlife and maintain patience in meeting their individual and communal obligations through iman and tauhid Evidently, Indonesians understood this concept in a differ- ent way.
Princeton University Press, , p. Coopera- tion with Japan had become wajib obligatory. Kartosuwiryo appeared very confident that Japan would support this idea: Until almost the end of the occupation […] it was they who held the keys to all power, and it was they who rigorously maintained the limits within which urban elites, especially, were allowed to move.
As MIAI gained socio-political success, Japanese administra- tors began to fear that the anti-Dutch sentiments predominant in pre-invasion Islamic circles would be translated into anti-Japanese sentiments.
Furthermore, Benda has suggested that it was the cre- ation of the bait al-mal as a monetary institution that tipped the balance and brought Japan to the decision to disband MIAI entire- ly.
As Japan was the ultimate gate-keeper of the political sphere, the rising prominence of the secular nationalists had wide-ranging effects. It was not until late December, when Japan was increasingly los- ing ground on the international scene, that local authorities once again embraced Islam as a key element of their anti-Western pro- paganda.
In an attempt to identify their defence as a holy war, they added a religious flavour to the Pembela Tanah Air, Peta, Army for the Defence of the Fatherland by placing the Muslim crescent on its flag. They also allowed Masyumi to have its own armed wing. Hizboellah was placed under the direction of Wahid Hasyim and was open to Indonesian Muslims between 17 and 25 years of age.
Trainees came from all over the archipelago, and in February the first group of started military and ideological training in Ciba- rusa, West Java, under the leadership of K.
Zainul Arifin. Among the several ulama providing spiritual training was K. Moestafa Kamil from Singaparna, the above-mentioned Sarekat Islam leader. Hasyim Latief, Laskar Hisbullah Surabaya: Ricklefs, A history of modern Indonesia since c. Palgrave, ], p. The Muslim party was aware that it would have meant the loss of its autonomy as well as of its leverage in securing a role for Islam in the future state of Indonesia.
At the time of the Japanese landing in , Indonesia and the Netherlands had already been rapidly drifting apart. Dai Nippon succeeded in finding its niche in the hearts of most Indonesians, harvesting support in rural and urban areas by co-opting political and administrative agents. The religious movement grew stron- ger under Japanese rule, as it became more coordinated, created a stronger structure and, most importantly, was provided with an armed wing: While the Allied forces were making progress against the Axis powers, Japan agreed to prepare Indonesia for independence.
And what would we do, then, if the Dutch took Yogya as well? What would be the fate of the people left behind? On an increasingly dynamic political stage, the inexperienced leaders of Muhammadiyah, Nahdatul Ulama and Masyumi were quickly sidelined by the nationalist elite. Islam and the making of the nation principles of kebangsaan nationalism , perkemanusiaan humanitar- ianism , permusyawaratan-perwakilan deliberation among represen- tatives , kesejahteraan social welfare and ketuhanan belief in One God.
The members of the Islamic faction had intended to further debate these changes, but as Japan was losing ground in the Pacific and would soon capitulate, Indonesian politicians felt compelled to accelerate their preparations for independence and to work with what they had.
By 7 August the committee had been cleansed of all Japanese members, and on the 11th, in the aftermath of the explo- sion of the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan reas- sured Soekarno and Hatta that independence would be granted on the 24th of that month. ISEAS, , pp. The members of the committee were Soekarno, Hatta, A. It was in the midst of this invasion that Karto- suwiryo transformed the West Java branch of Masyumi into the Darul Islam group, setting aside his commitment to the parliamentary struggle, an effort that he had renewed as recently as August At the national level, in the years following the Japanese capitu- lation, Masyumi would become more insistent in its demands for an Islamic state, also calling it a darul Islam.
In the Party pro- claimed armed resistance to the Dutch a jihad, and occasionally Masyumi took an aggressive stand against the Republican adminis- tration. Political clashes soon had their counterpart on the battle ground, as Republican troops and Islamic militias tended to keep separate. The Dutch invasion and the ensuing treaty the Ling- gadjati Agreement further heightened tensions, as West Java was declared de facto Dutch territory, thus establishing the end of Republican authority over the region.
Yet as the British were unable to land until late September, Java was left to its own fate as a contested space between the retreating Japanese, the Indonesian nationalists and the re-invading Dutch troops. The first and perhaps most significant of such incidents was the kidnap- ping of Soekarno and Hatta by a group of radical nationalists who wanted independence declared before Japan transferred authority to the Allies. In the weeks following their surrender, the Japanese were still in charge.
The British commander requested, albeit unsuccessfully, that all internees remain in the camps, so as to avoid the spread of vengeful violence. Lawlessness was rampant in the towns and the countryside, with the Japanese, Europeans and Chinese becoming the favourite targets of local gangs.
Jakarta was the centre of a strug- gle for power among the Dutch, Japanese and Indonesians, in the midst of which British troops quietly mediated to re-establish law and order.
On the political front, Soekarno and Hatta acted as if the proclamation had been forced upon them. They did very little to establish government structures, instead focusing on diplomacy and leaving most of the action to the so-called laskar militia , both in Jakarta as well as in the neighbouring areas.
The apex of this conflict in strategy was reached in mid September, when Soekarno interrupted a mass rally in the capital with calls for peace and order instead of showing his support for the revolutionary intent of the demonstrators. Sebuah konsensus nasional tentang dasar negara Republik Indonesia , 3rd ed.
Gema Insani Press, , p. An official Dutch municipal administration was not constituted until February But when British troops succeeded in bringing the city under total control in December, most laskar fled the town, and the Republican government gradually withdrew to Central Java, leaving Jakarta in the hands of the Europeans. Having transformed the KNIP into a legislative body, Soekarno called on Indonesians to form politi- cal parties and to begin preparations for parliamentary elections, scheduled for the following year in January.
The nationalist front was far from united, and in October the socialist Soetan Sjahrir released his Perjuangan kita Our struggle pamphlet, indirectly accusing Soekarno of cooperation with the Japanese and of dis- playing sympathies for Tan Malaka.
Tan Malaka was the leader of the communist group, who, it had emerged, had in October and November been preparing for a coup. To avoid the potentially destabilizing alliance of Sjahrir with Tan Malaka, in mid Novem- ber Soekarno offered Sjahrir the opportunity to form the cabinet. The Lieutenant Governor-General realized that the Japanese occupation had strengthened the nationalists to the point that their struggle for independence had gained too much momen- tum to be restrained by military force.
Restraining the movement was even less tenable because the Netherlands would have had to rely on British troops, which had neither an interest nor a stake in reinstating Dutch colonial rule. Further widening the existing rift between Jakarta and The Hague, Van Mook initiated talks with the nationalist leadership, as he saw a viable solution only in diplomacy. In the window between the Japanese defeat and the Dutch return, the political scene changed dramatically.
How- ever, the party with the widest and deepest support in late — and until the end of the decade — was Masyumi, which had reor- ganized itself in November. Several other parties were founded in , yet only these three played significant roles during the revolution and in the early years of the Republic. Sanoesi, and K. Noer and Akbarsyah, K. Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat.
Parlemen Indonesia Jakarta: Yayasan Risalah, Supplement [hereafter Supp] no. Within a year, the leadership would change dramatically. According to a Dutch overview of the Malay press in West Java, Masyumi was calling upon Indonesians to work towards unifying religion and state. Majelis Sjoero: Wahid Hasjim and Kasman Singodimedjo as vice-chairmen.