Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking. Malcolm Gladwell. Introduction - The Statue That Didn't Look Right. In September of , an art dealer by the. PDF | On Oct 1, , Robin M. Hogarth and others published Blink: the power of thinking without thinking, Malcolm Gladwell. New York: Little. 𝗣𝗗𝗙 | Reviews the book, Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking by Malcolm Gladwell (see record ). In this book, Gladwell aims to tie a.
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Also by John C. Maxwell.. of the evening, as Steve and I were walking to our car, he said to me How Successful People. BLINK. ALSO BY MALCOLM GLADWELL. The Tipping Point. The Power of Thinking. Without Thinking. MALCOLM GLADWELL. 1 8 3 7. LITTLE, BROWN AND. Blink: The Power of Thinking. Without Thinking. Based on Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, Malcolm. Gladwell, Little Brown and Co., NY and.
That much is straightforward. We have some experiences. We think them through. We develop a theory. And then finally we put two and two together. But the Iowa scientists did something else, and this is where the strange part of the experiment begins. They hooked each gambler up to a machine that measured the activity of the sweat glands below the skin in the palms of their hands. Like most of our sweat glands, those in our palms respond to stress as well as temperature— which is why we get clammy hands when we are nervous.
What the Iowa scientists found is that gamblers started generating stress responses to the red decks by the tenth card, forty cards before they were able to say that they had a hunch about what was wrong with those two decks.
More important, right around the time their palms started sweating, their behavior began to change as well.
They started favoring the blue cards and taking fewer and fewer cards from the red decks. In other words, the gamblers figured the game out before they realized they had figured the game out: The Iowa experiment is just that, of course, a simple card game involving a handful of subjects and a stress detector.
Here is a situation where the stakes were high, where things were moving quickly, and where the participants had to make sense of a lot of new and confusing information in a very short time. What does the Iowa experiment tell us?
That in those moments, our brain uses two very different strategies to make sense of the situation.
This strategy is logical and definitive. But it takes us eighty cards to get there. It operates a lot more quickly. It has the drawback, however, that it operates—at least at first—entirely below the surface of consciousness. It sends its messages through weirdly indirect channels, such as the sweat glands in the palms of our hands. They considered only what could be gathered in a glance. Did they know why they knew?
Not at all. But they knew. The Internal Computer The part of our brain that leaps to conclusions like this is called the adaptive unconscious, and the study of this kind of decision making is one of the most important new fields in psychology.
The adaptive unconscious is not to be confused with the unconscious described by Sigmund Freud, which was a dark and murky place filled with desires and memories and fantasies that were too disturbing for us to think about consciously. This new Downloaded from www. When you walk out into the street and suddenly realize that a truck is bearing down on you, do you have time to think through all your options?
Of course not. As the psychologist Timothy D. Wilson writes in his book Strangers to Ourselves: The adaptive unconscious does an excellent job of sizing up the world, warning people of danger, setting goals, and initiating action in a sophisticated and efficient manner.
A decision to invite a co-worker over for dinner is conscious. You think it over. You decide it will be fun. You ask him or her. The spontaneous decision to argue with that same co-worker is made unconsciously—by a different part of the brain and motivated by a different part of your personality. How long, for example, did it take you, when you were in college, to decide how good a teacher your professor was?
A class? Two classes? A semester? Then Ambady cut the clips back to five seconds, and the ratings were the same. They were remarkably consistent even when she showed the students just two seconds of videotape. Then Ambady compared those snap judgments of teacher effectiveness with evaluations of those same professors made by their students after a full semester of classes, and she found that they were also essentially the same.
You may have done the same thing, whether you realized it or not, when you first picked up this book. How long did you first hold it in your hands?
Two seconds? And yet in that short space of time, the design of the cover, whatever associations you may have with my name, and the first few sentences about the kouros all generated an impression—a flurry of thoughts and images and preconceptions—that has fundamentally shaped the way you have read this introduction so far. I think we are innately suspicious of this kind of rapid cognition.
We live in a world that assumes that the quality of a decision is directly related to the time and effort that went into making it. When doctors are faced with a difficult diagnosis, they order more tests, and when we are uncertain about what we hear, we ask for a second opinion.
And what do we tell our children? Haste makes waste. Look before you leap. Stop and think. We believe that we are always better off gathering as much information as possible and spending as much time as possible in deliberation. We really only trust conscious decision making. But there are moments, particularly in times of stress, when haste does not make waste, when our snap judgments and first impressions can offer a much better means of making sense of the world. The first task of Blink is to convince you of a simple fact: Gladwell also uses many examples of regular people's experiences with "thin-slicing," including our instinctive ability to mind-read, which is how we can get to know a person's emotions just by looking at his or her face.
Gladwell explains how an expert's ability to "thin slice" can be corrupted by their likes and dislikes, prejudices, and stereotypes even unconscious ones.
Two particular forms of unconscious bias Gladwell discusses are implicit association tests  and psychological priming. Gladwell also mentions that sometimes having too much information can interfere with the accuracy of a judgment, or a doctor's diagnosis.
In what Gladwell contends is an age of information overload, he finds that experts often make better decisions with snap judgments than they do with volumes of analysis. This is commonly called " Analysis paralysis. The other information may be irrelevant and confusing.
Collecting more information, in most cases, may reinforce our judgment but does not help make it more accurate. Gladwell explains that better judgments can be executed from simplicity and frugality of information.
If the big picture is clear enough to decide, then decide from this without using a magnifying glass. The book argues that intuitive judgment is developed by experience, training, and knowledge. For example, Gladwell claims that prejudice can operate at an intuitive unconscious level, even in individuals whose conscious attitudes are not prejudiced. One example is the halo effect , where a person having a salient positive quality is thought to be superior in other, unrelated respects.
The example used in the book is the Warren Harding trap. Because Warren G. Harding looked so much like a respectable person in , Henry Daugherty was impressed and helped him become president of the United States of America, while Harding himself did nothing extraordinary for his political career.
Respected medical doctors who respect and listen to their patients' needs are less likely to get sued. See the research of Alice Burkin and Wendy Levison. Prejudices and false first impressions may be overcome through positive examples of people all over the world and experience.
If a manager gives power to his coworkers, they can act more independently and faster while at the same time being more innovative. This is shown through Paul van Riper. If people are asked to explain their impressions and experience, they are less likely to remember what they felt.
The act of describing an experience with words overrides part of the ability in the brain to remember the feelings as Jonathan W. Schooler showed.
Research and examples[ edit ] The book begins with the story of the Getty kouros , which was a statue brought to the J. Paul Getty Museum in California. It was thought by many experts to be legitimate, but when others first looked at it, their initial responses were skeptical.