library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data. Deleuze, Gilles. [Difference et repetition. English]. Difference and repetition/Gilles De1euze: translated by. Gilles Deleuze. Difference and Repetition. Translated by. Paul Patton. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS. NEW YORK There is a great difference between writing history of philosophy and writing with enthusiasm, Difference and Repetition was the first book in which I tried to ' do.
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A revised, expanded and fully up-to-date critical introduction to Deleuze's most important work of philosophyBy critically analysing Deleuze's methods. Deleuze - Difference and Repetition - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf) or view presentation slides online. Deluze Difference and Repetition. Deleuze's Difference and aracer.mobi - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read book online.
These layers describe different ways in which past and future can be inscribed in a present. As this inscription grows more complicated, the status of the present itself becomes more abstract.
Passive synthesis[ edit ] Basic processes of the universe have a momentum that they carry into each present moment. A 'contraction' of reality refers to the collection of a diffuse ongoing force into the present. Prior thought and behavior, all substance performs contraction. Every organism, in its receptive and perceptual elements, but also in its viscera, is a sum of contractions, of retentions and expectations" Passive synthesis is exemplified by habit. Habit incarnates the past and gestures to the future in the present by transforming the weight of experience into an urgency.
Habit creates a multitude of "larval selves," each of which functions like a small ego with desires and satisfactions. In Freudian discourse, this is the domain of bound excitations associated with the pleasure principle. Deleuze cites Hume and Bergson as relevant to his understanding of the passive synthesis.
Active synthesis[ edit ] The second level of time is organized by the active force of memory , which introduces discontinuity into the passage of time by sustaining relationships between more distant events. A discussion of destiny makes clear how memory transforms time and enacts a more profound form of repetition: Destiny never consists in step-by-step deterministic relations between presents which succeed one another according to the order of a represented time.
Rather, it implies between successive presents non-localisable connections, actions at a distance, systems of replay, resonance and echoes, objective chances, signs, signals, and roles which transcend spatial locations and temporal successions. It deals with events in their depth and structure rather than in their contiguity in time. Where passive syntheses created a field of 'me's,' active synthesis is performed by 'I.
Proust and Lacan are key authors for this layer. Empty time[ edit ] The third layer of time still exists in the present, but it does so in a way that breaks free from the simple repetition of time. This level refers to an ultimate event so powerful that it becomes omnipresent.
It is a great symbolic event, like the murder to be committed by Oedipus or Hamlet. Upon rising to this level, an actor effaces herself as such and joins the abstract realm of eternal return. The me and the I give way to "the man without name, without family, without qualities, without self or I Empty time is associated with Thanatos, a desexualized energy that runs through all matter and supersedes the particularity of an individual psychic system.
Deleuze is careful to point out that there is no reason for Thanatos to produce a specifically destructive impulse or 'death instinct' in the subject; he conceives of Thanatos as simply indifferent. Nietzsche , Borges , and Joyce are Deleuze's authors for the third time. The Image of Thought[ edit ] This chapter takes aim at an "image of thought" that permeates both popular and philosophical discourse.
According to this image, thinking naturally gravitates towards truth. Thought is divided easily into categories of truth and error. The model for thought comes from the educational institution, in which a master sets a problem and the pupil produces a solution which is either true or false.
This image of the subject supposes that there are different faculties, each of which ideally grasps the particular domain of reality to which it is most suited. In philosophy, this conception results in discourses predicated on the argument that "Everybody knows Descartes , for example, appeals to the idea that everyone can at least think and therefore exists. Deleuze points out that philosophy of this type attempts to eliminate all objective presuppositions while maintaining subjective ones.
Deleuze maintains, with Artaud , that real thinking is one of the most difficult challenges there is. Thinking requires a confrontation with stupidity , the state of being formlessly human without engaging any real problems.
One discovers that the real path to truth is through the production of sense: the creation of a texture for thought that relates it to its object.
Sense is the membrane that relates thought to its other. Accordingly, learning is not the memorization of facts but the coordination of thought with a reality. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.
No institutional affiliation. LOG IN. The Journal of Nietzsche Studies. Gilles Deleuze's "Difference and Repetition": In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: James Williams. Nietzsche is of intrinsic importance to Deleuze, and hence it is If you would like to authenticate using a different subscribed institution that supports Shibboleth authentication or have your own login and password to Project MUSE.
Rent from DeepDyve Recommend. Additional Information. Project MUSE Mission Project MUSE promotes the creation and dissemination of essential humanities and social science resources through collaboration with libraries, publishers, and scholars worldwide. Leibniz presents the following alternative view: Space in this sense is therefore secondary to the 'order of things'.
On this view. For space denotes in terms of possibility an order of things which exist at the same tune. The main point to take from Leibniz. If space is independent of the things within it. This does not mean that spatial properties are entirely arbitrary.
If that is the case. They are what Leibniz calls. The fact that hands are left or right handed therefore means that there must be an 'internaI difference' that is not a conceptual determination.
We can make this point dearer by noting that the property of handedness is intimately related to the nature of the space in which the object is placed. In both cases. But this is impossible. Kant rejected his earlier Leibnizian interpretation of space in favour of a Newtonian conception. Let it be irnagined that the first created thing were a human hand. For this reason. The dimensionality of space therefore determines whether the counterparts are congruous or incongruent.
Kant's system. If one accepts the concept of modern. If we consider the same triangle in a three-dimensional space. In order to produce one a different action of the creative cause is necessary from that. A Guide to the Text 19 Kant first introduces the incongruent counterparts argument in his pre-cri tic al work. In Kant's later critical philosophy. German philosophers. In this dass are not only species produced by artificial blockages. The incongruent counterparts argument lays the gToundwork for this distinction by showing that space cannot be understood in conceptual tenus.
Three Fonns of Difference There are at least three different conceptions of difference at work in the introduction. This is a difference which has its principle outside of the conceptual realm: In the transcendental aesthetic of the Critique qf Pure Reason. Kant hints at a thinl kind of difference.
Space is an intuition. Kant makes two daims about intuition: The second kind of difference is the difTerence of the incongTuent counterparts themselves. For Deleuze. This is the kind of difference that can be represented. It is a1ready clear from the everyday examp1e of the two hands that the figure of a body ean be eompletely similar to that of another. Kant presents this difference in the Regions in.
In the two cases we have looked at here. Deleuze's project is therefore going to be to perform an enquiry into the principle of difference which neither sees it as conceptuaI nor sees its non-conceptuality as the end of our enquiry. This then leads to the end of our enquiry since we lack the conceptual tools to do justice to it.
As weIl as the surface repetition of the incongruent counterparts themselves. In doing so. Deleuze will want to provide a transcendental account of the operation of this principle of difference which explains why cases such as left and right handedness appear in the first place. Either we see it as conceptual difference. Normally when we look at difference.
Rather than remaining at the level of spatial difference itself. Deleuze wants to provide an account of the genesis of the kind of spatiality which Kant takes as his starting point. A Guide to the Text 21 The inner princip le which aIlows internaI difference to emerge in the case of Kant's thought is the nature of space itself.
Chapter 10 Difference in 1tself 1. What would a state of indifference involve? Deleuze gives two examples: The undifferenciated abyss presents a situation whereby one of the se conditions has not been met. While representation is able to qualify fonns and subjects 'this square is red'. There are no properties present in the subject.
The first of these represents a space that has not been differenciated. Without difference. The proper functioning of representation therefore requires two parts to it. So in order to make a judgement about something. The first of these possibilities.
There are properties but no subjects to attribute them to. The process of representation therefore collapses again. Such an abyss is in a literaI. The second quotation brings out the second role of difference: Deleuze here outlines two ways in which we might understand difference.
Difference as a concept is what allows us to draw distinctions within this identity 'this differs from that'. First there is the subject the 'it'. Form simply has to be imposed on something fundamentally non-representational.
This structure is the basic structure of judgement: The first of these is tied to representation andjudgement.
Deleuze associates representation with the question. Second there is the predicate. Deleuze's analysis of Aristotle essentially focuses on his concept of difference. With a few minor deviations. Underneath the represented world of subjects and properties is a differential field of intensity. Deleuze will condude with a discussion of Plato as the thinker who founds representation.
It attempts to mediate this concept of difference through the structures of identity. The structure of Deleuze's argument is therefore as follows. Difference is therefore Deleuze's name for this process of the emergence of form. Deleuze's aim in this chapter is to show the failure of this project.
A Guide to the Text 23 sense unthinkable. Deleuze's characterisation of Aristotle is central to Deleuze's own positive account.
This is the dialectic of representation which operates in the opening of Chapter 1. Deleuze begins by giving a short exposition ofAristotle's philosophy as the first formulation of representation. The difference between the formless abyss and form must be something that Falls outside of representation. His aim is to show how Aristotle's formulation of difference as relational and oppositional x differs From y if x is not y forces on him a certain conception of being.
If form. The fact that representation cannot think its own ground presents a serious problem. If it were used in this way. For Porphyry and Aristotle.
Following on from the introduction. This case would be the one reached so far. In this section. This fo11ows from Aristotle's own definition: We therefore need the intermediary category. Porphyry first defines the species as 'that which is predicated. Deleuze's daim will be that if we see difference as spatial. We can therefore say that Socrates is both animal according to his genus and man according to his species.
While it is the case that a given genus. If we take the case of Socrates. We can see that a given germs can be predicated of a species. Porphyry writes that 'the intermediate. This would mean that in essence each individu al wou Id be different only in number. Porphyry defines the genus as 'what is predicated in answer to "What is it?
His aim is going to be to show that how we understand being and difference are fundamentally interrelated. VVe cannot have a difference between. Difference is the criterion by which. What is the role of difference in this hierarchy? In order for two things to differ. If differences between things of different genera are too broad. Thus we have a hierarchy. The most proper difference.
Specifie difference is what allows species to be defined in Porphyry's tree by dividing the genus. The difference of rational or non-rational makes sense because of the shared predicate of animal. Aristotle argues that they must also have something in common. The last category we need to consider are accidents. Proper differences deal "vith inseparable properties of things.
Renee these stand in two relations. A Guide to the Text 25 items wiU be species of the items before them and genera of the items after them. These can either be separable as in the case of Socrates.
Porphyry introduces three farms of difference: A consequence of this is that we now need to define the species in terms of something other than the individu al. POl1 hyry is not implying that what we have here is a temporal constitution we don't find in the world beings that are only determined as animaIs.
As we have seen. His claim is that such a model cannot de al with the extreme cases of determination. We begin with a property which belongs to everything. Porphyry Il Of course. Conceptually significant difference therefore occupics a middie point between the extremes of otherness and accidentaI difference: Porphyry therefore provides an account of the determination of objects that allows us to characterise an of their essential determinations through a process of division.
This involves a problematic notion of resemblance between changing perceptions and an unchanging essence.
For in the case of objects which are constituted of matter and form or which have a constitution at least analogous to matter and form. He divides the difficulties with Aristotle's model into problems of 'the Large'. It should be clear that a difference cannot be the same type of thing as that which it differentiates. The problem of the highest gerlUs is recognised by Aristotle. While Deleuze's characterisation of these problems may seem obscure.
Aristotle b: It is not possible that either unity or being should be a genus of things. We can show this by taking as an example the case of living bodies. If the difference between living bodies was itself a living body. As Deleuze puts it. It is not simply the difference in being that would lack being. A Guide to the Text 27 the indeterminate animal in which everything is dissolved.
When things have a name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is called the same. How do these terms relate to the question of being? Being clearly cannot be synonymous.
Aristotle a: Being could be. Aristotle opens his Categories with a discussion of three tenns. Ifwe are to be able to talk meaningfully about the world.
Aristotle argues that while these different senses of being are not identical. Since words apply to different objects. But as we have just seen. It therefore appears that there cannot be a coherent formulation of the concept of metaphysics. Aristotle argues that there are several different classes of being. When things get their name from something. In order to resolve this problem. Aristotle proposes that we consider being to be a paronymous concept.
Things can therefore be said to be. If we look at the notions of substance and properties. A Guide to the Text 29 homonyrnous. What would such a concept look like? Aristotle gives the following example: Just as that which is healthy ail has reference to health.
We can now return to the difficulty which Deleuze finds with this response to the problem of the. Therefore it is going to be logically secondary to a focal meaning.
Rather than simply being a heap. It is quite straightforward to relate this idea of paronymy to the concept ofbeing.. Being would therefore just be a conjunction of different ten11S. Clearly health is different from. Being still cannot be defined without presupposing a yet higher concept. We have just seen that Deleuze finds substantial problems with this account.
Before discussing Scotus. When we ask the question. Being is therefore put outside of the world of species and genera. This rules out in advance any possible account of the genesis of the subject. The central point to note is that medieval theologians saw a fundamental difference between the.. It is for this reason that Deleuze introduces the indifference of white nothingness. Deleuze argues that while Aristotle provides an account of the determination of objects..
This tradition moves From Duns Scotus. In the next few sections. As we saw. He therefore daims that 'there has only ever been one ontological proposition: To deal first with the question of black nothingness. He is going to argue that we need to think the faintly paradoxicalnotion 'unconnected determinations' if we are to think of the emergence of the subject itself.
This daim is that the problems with the analogical conception of being cannot be solved. Now the very fact that a term like 'good' opera tes in these different ways when we use it to describe an object or person in the world or to describe God ll11plies that when we use this term.
As we saw with Aristotle. In this instance. Scotus has two main reasons for supposing that being fits this category ofunivocity. Such a position has certain advantages. It was taken for granted by the scholastics that God's nature is essentiaUy simple it is not composed of parts. He defines univocity as foUows: Aquinas' use of analogy relies on the likeness of cause and effect our goodness is caused by God. Such an analogical argument presupposes some for of understanding of God's nature.
God's goodness is the focal meaning by which finite goodness gets its own meaning. A Guide to the Text 31 concept of finite things.
Scotus instead takes being to be univocal and 'indifferen[t] to what is infinite and finite' Duns Scotus a: This highlights a fundamentallimitation to our understanding of God because when we look at objects that we have access to. It is here that Aquinas brings in the notion of analogy. It is against this view that Scotus develops his own position: In a certain manner this means that the tick is God.
The infinite is defined by not being limite d. Rather than finitude being defined by relation to a limit.
To see how such a concept can be formed. If the finite and infinite are understood in these terms. Form hovvever is limited through matter inasmuch as a form considered in itself is common to many things.
We might also want to ask how Scotus is able to explain the simplicity of the nature of God. The central daim is that mu ch as we can determine spatial.
Now matter is in a certain way 1imited through form. He then asks us to apply this model of extensive infinity to a qualitative perfection. Thus being would seem to occupy a place higher in the Porphyrian hierarchy than God.
To return to Aquinas for a moment. Scotus firsts asks us to imagine an infinitely large magnitude. Scotus' resolution of these difficulties rests on his understanding of finitude and infinity. Deleuze l'aises this point as follows in one of his lectures: Because l say: It becomes a mad thought. Aquinas defines infinity as follows: Something is said to be infinite from the fact that it is not 1imited. Scotus instead therefore introduces the notion of an 'intrinsic degree' ofbeing.
Differences are. But the imperfect concept is common to this and that white. Finite being in turn is like a finite degree of whiteness. When we looked at Porphyry's theOl"y of species and genera.
The fact. This ultimately allows Scotus to solve the two difficulties of the highest genus and the simplicity of God. Scotus gives the following example in tenns of colour: God is not. In neither case are the notions relational. In the case of a perfection. Finitude and infinity are therefore modes. A Guide to the Text 33 magnitudes. Instead of understanding infinity and finitude as species of being.
Ordo I. The notion of infinity that Scotus is developing is therefore of an intensive. Infinite whiteness is not defined by a lack of limitation. Such a concept would. Intensity as it stands is purely a difference in the degree ofsomething's being. If this kind of distinction was applied to finite and infinite being. If we take away the concept of whiteness. Scotus' notion of the distinction allows us to avoid this difficulty.
As such. Clearly there is a difference between whitenesses of different degrees of intensity. While we can therefore formulate a concept ofbeing without reference to its intensity. We can note however. As said of the ten categories. Such a position in fact is the one that Deleuze wants to develop in his own philosophy.
Scotus' daim would then be that being always presents itself with a given degree of intensity which is inseparable from it.
For Scotus on the contrary.. The gap between finite and infinite is therefore still a chasm which allows the separation of God and his creation to be maintained. In De an. When we look at the concept of the intensity itself. Spinoza defines substance as follows: For Descartes. A Guide to the Text 35 By making this difference a difference in kind. At this point it would be useful to go through three of the key tenus in Spinoza's philosophy substance.
Spinoza disputes this daim. This does not just mean that there is only one substance. Spinoza is here very dose to Descartes' definition of substance as 'a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence'.
Part 1 D3.
Scotus separates man from God. At this point. How does this relate to the question of how to distinguish or determine entities? Each person has a separate mind. Part 1 P5. As substance is logically prior to its modes. Spinoza defines an attribute as 'that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence' Spinoza Part 1 D4. Spinoza goes beyond Scotus by moving from a conception of univocal being as purely abstract to one whereby we in practice encounter one being.
Scotus' solution was to rely on the notion of a formaI distinction between the different attributes so that while they were not actually distinct as things separate From one another. Scotus' attributes are really just what Deleuze calls 'signs' for the intellect. Spinoza has to explain how it is possible for the same substance to be expressed by two different essences.
Given that the world contains at least both things and ideas. They express a way in which the nature of God is to be taken up by the finite subject. It is to an extent ambiguous how they are to be read in Spinoza. The question for Scotus was how an infinite being could both be understood as simple. For Spinoza. Extension plays a purely definitional role in this case. God is a separa te entity to the world. So in answer to the question. They are formally distinct From each other. As Deleuze recognises.
His definition of 'what the intellect perceives of a substance. Attributes operate in a similar way for Spinoza. Modes are modifications of a singular substance. According to Deleuze. A Guide to the Text 37 essence of God. He defines them as follows: Spinoza instead argues that substance is really distinct. This led to the problem. We therefore have a progression between the nature of God being known analogically for Aquinas.
Spinoza argues that finite things are modifications of infinite substance. Spinoza develops a similar account of the nature of finite modes. If modes are to be distinct. Intensity is the mode by which whiteness manifests itself. Just as intensity is only modally distinct from whiteness. So Spinoza's metaphysics presents the world as the expression of the essence of God.
While we can formulate a concept of whiteness separately from the intensity by which it manifests itself. Whereas the essence of God is known formally for Scotus as a 'sign'. This is in essence the same problem that we found in Scotus' attempt to develop a univocal conception ofbeing which was at the same time applicable to fini te and infinite beings. Earlier on. In order to define something for Aristotle.
This brings us to the final part of his system l want to discuss: If the world is the essence ofGod. Modes operate in the opposite manner. Here we rely on the second ofScotus' distinctions. They are. Part 1 D5. Thus being is like the concept ofwhiteness. Substance is determined by a difTerence. This is therefore one of the most difficult ideas in Deleuze's metaphysics: Deleuze daims that for Spinoza.
Such a condition can be satisfied only at the price of a more general categorical reversaI according to which being is said of becoming. We define something by saying that it is 'this and not that'. We must be able to separate the rational animaIs from the nonrational animaIs as separately existing entities in order to define man as a rational animal. Spinoza's system therefore makes no distinction between difTerent ways in which things exist.
Spinoza's substance. Although the world appears to be made up of difTerent substances. This essence is not one that can be given in terms of the categories. Substance does have a structure and an essence. This is made possible on the basis of the univocal conception ofbeing. In order ta overcome this limitation. Deleuze's point is that the relation of modes to being is still structured like the terms of a judgement. In su ch a case. The modes are said ifbeing. Deleuze sees the eternal return as Nietzsche's formulation of the univocity principle.
Let us begin by looking at the section from the Genealogy qf. Nietzsche presents a contrast between h. There is nothing strange about the fact that lambs bear a grudge towards large birds of prey: The first is section 13 of Essay 1 of the Genealogy qf.
For the bird of prey.
And if the lambs say to each other. A quantum of force is just such a quantum of drive.