In book: The Gulf War and the New World Order, Edition: softback, Chapter: The New World Order, Publisher: Zed Books, Editors: Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis, pp Am completing manuscript on history of Zionism as a Colonial Settler state. The media war - USA vs. EU. THE. NEW WORLD. ORDER. Whether it is attainable, how it can be attained, and what sort world peace; already we have had far too much abolition of war. FINAL WARNING: A History of the New World Order. In , a group of international bankers secretly met on a small island off the coast of Georgia. Their plan.

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NEW. WORLD. ORDER by. A. Ralph Epperson. (This material has been reconstructed () from various sources on the internet; and grateful thanks is given. aracer.mobi Killers of the Flower Moon the hidden history of money & new world order usury secrets. A. Ralph Epperson The New World Order Pdf. Topics The new world order. Collectionopensource. LanguageEnglish. A must reading book.

For multiculturalism, community is an eternal structure that exists prior to and beyond the activities of its constituting members. It is a transcendental form, an ideally proposed frame independent of real, actual human beings. Consequently, multiculturalism attributes essential properties to tradition and culture, romanticizes the past and particular cultural and traditional practices regardless of their content. A trend both in academic and political circles uncritically promotes all cultures and traditions. Multiculturalism serves the benefits of capitalism in the era of the New World Order. Multiculturalism does not signify a simple practical or political directedness in reaction to immediate political issues as some of its proponents claim.

Where Taylor formulates the tension between the individual and the social as an opposition between theory of rights and cultural differences and then tends to resolve it with reference to dialogicality of the individual, Habermas proposes that the two are compatible and intends to resolve the aforementioned tension with reference to notions of authorship of the law and intersubjectivity. In the final analysis, the process of socialization is external to the subject, which implies that the subject is conceived as an entity independent of society and sociality.

Thus, the tension between the individual and the social remains unresolved. Although he warns about the conceptual complexities that may result from confusing these phenomena, Habermas treats all of them as if they belong to the same level of abstraction: nation, as well as culture is confined with gender, which is biologically determined.

And all these are being related to the just cause of struggling against colonialism. Habermas considers nation and culture as sui generis entities. Inequalities, therefore, are not product of cultures and neither exclusive to a number of them —say minority cultures.

Inequalities, alongside other qualities and social relations are being continuously produced; cultures are the carriers of inequalities inherited from the past, say, discrimination against certain communities and their members, and not the demiurges of these inequalities. Inequality in this view is just a matter of getting advantage of something and not a matter of produced and reproduced social relations.

Does Kymlicka suggest any other solution than reliance on the mercy of the dominants? And what is the source of such a mercy if it exists at all? It is then implied that the dominant culture that is endowed with liberal values promotes the individuality and independence of persons, that is, the dominant, liberal culture is so structured that it submits to its own instantiation, while, when it comes to the disadvantaged cultures, they are so conceived that they do not attribute independence to the person, which is its instantiation or embodiment.

In other words, members of liberal cultures are independent and liberal, members of disadvantaged cultures or non-liberal cultures are non-liberal and disadvantaged.

Notwithstanding the obvious determinism of this account, as a well-intentioned member of liberal culture he assumes the right to first submit the right of the individuals and the cultures to enjoy certain rights and privileges, and second, he assumes the right to decide what element should be preserved in certain cultures with reference to liberal cultural standards. In this view language, history, and culture are treated on the same footing: 1. Kymlicka simply ignores the fact that neither of the aforementioned has any reality and significance independent from social relations.

Moreover, at a more particular level, these differences acquire political significance because they have been made politically, that is, they acquire political significance within the framework of modern capitalist society, for instance, in the process of nation-formation. In this, it turns into the justification of the status-quo. The point, however, is to explain this diversity and differentiation. They claim that the tendency of economic growth is independent of social structure ; that is, it is rooted in human nature and human situation.

The point, however, is to explain the phenomena of poverty and wealth and the reality of this very stratification.

Her main thesis is that justice requires both redistribution and recognition , Both traditional left and Fraser view the social world as fragmented and divided into identities. Political movements, in this view, are the expression of the struggle of identities toward realization of their rights, just as for Taylor and liberal multiculturalists politics is the expression of a culture.

Consequently, Fraser aims at providing a theory that functions as a magical agglutinating device. According to Fraser recognition promotes the putative specificity of a group while redistribution aims at abolishing the economic base of group specificity , Thus follows the redistribution-recognition dilemma. Class, for Fraser, first and foremost, is but another form of identity that, due to goodwill of redistribution politicians, ought to be abolished.

Moreover, it is a conglomeration of individual labor-force sellers. This is to view the class through individual bourgeois lenses as a fetish that is best expressed in trade unionism. This view does not consider class a social relation but as a physical-mechanical relation of some end-products, that is, workers.

According to this view exploitation takes place in the workshop only. With the same token, a worker is not exploited when he or she is asleep or when she or he is unemployed. Following the same path of reasoning one can say that human being is not alienated as a result of existing mode of production which is a social relation, because human beings are distributed through out the entire class structure of capitalist society.

This view fails to see that society itself is the very product of relations of production and is thus a social relation. All relations, roles, inequalities, and injustices are continuously produced and reproduced within the existing society and are parts of social relations. Certain inequalities, for instance sexual discrimination, may be rooted in 12 and inherited from past. However, this does not make sexual discrimination an archaic problem; sexual discrimination is produced at present, under capitalist mode of production and thus the struggle against such discrimination is an aspect of class struggle.

It is no longer a question of religious interests as such. Fraser, to the contrary, conceives both class and culture as atomic things in themselves. The immediate response to sexual or any other form of discrimination is abolishing discrimination and construing reverse discrimination if necessary. The speculative thinker reduces the real entities into manifestations of an essence, which is arrived at through mere abstraction.

Reifying this abstract idea as the substance, the real thing appears as its semblances. The multitude of the real being is explained as the manifestation of the self-movement of the substance—the real becomes a mode of this substance only.

The political-economic view of capital as self-generating wealth and the idea of culture, not as the totality and ever-changing products of human activity but as a self-contained fetish, are among other examples of such an outlook.

If culture determines, in the way multiculturalist claim it does, the being of its members, then how the diversity within one culture is to be explained? How come, say, I am different than my fellow culture-mate? Notwithstanding the enigma why Culture manifests this self-movement in the form of culture, at other times in the form of individual person. Perhaps, some Medieval-type theory of emanation is at work. Multiculturalism divides and categorizes people illegitimately and unjustifiably.

In this view, the idea of human rights regardless of certain historical and social attributes is not plausible. This is to say that, in multiculturalist view humans do not have human identity per se, and neither have they human rights.

Culture as a political phenomenon is the product of culturist movements just as nation is the product of nationalism.

Culturism, in most of the cases, is a covert form of particularist, localist, nationalist, religious, or ethnicist politics. Ontologically speaking, culture does not exist independent from human activity.

Culture is not a sui generis entity. Regardless of this dependency, culture, in the hand of culturist movements, is made into an imaginary self-contained entity that has the ability to mobilize groups of people in service of certain terrestrial benefits. The alleged essentiality of culture and its appearance in the political scene as a political entity does not make it ontologically self- contained; culture does not become an in-itself entity just as nation does not become an itself entity and never loses its socio-historical determinations despite the claims and wishes of the nationalist movements.

Attributing essentiality to culture out of goodwill reproduces this reified image of culture as a permanent, in-itself entity, and consequently, voluntarily or involuntarily, contributes to strengthening of culturist ideology and political position. The rest of Canada saw that the distinct society clause legitimated collective goals. Societies, accordingly, have characters that determine what kind of rights and what type of system of governance should be chosen for them.

Clearly, Taylor reproduces the aforementioned culturist stance that takes politics to be the reflection of culture. Taylor eventually defends political Islam and its totalitarian politics, because such politics is the political expression of another culture. Liberalism is not the common ground upon which cultures of different range can meet; however, this does not exclude the right of these non-liberal cultures to practice their undesirable ways in their own societies.

Hence follows the peaceful coexistence of cultures.

FOUNDATIONS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

All in all, in order to justify this implicit defense of political Islam and its totalitarian regimes, which is the inevitable result of viewing politics as nothing but the expression of culture, Taylor claims that liberalism is the product and continuation of Christianity and Christian culture.

The picture is complete: Christian religion yields to Christian Culture which finds its expression in liberalism and a half-hearted defense of basic human rights. On the contrary, Islam yields to Islamic culture, the political expression of which is political Islam and its totalitarian regimes. In the attitude of the Jews to the Christian world he could see only the attitude of the Jewish religion to the Christian religion What we are combating in Bauer's criticism is precisely speculation reproducing itself as a caricature.

There is no place for productive and reproductive activity in this definition. Culture is a historically given ready-made goods. Such depiction is a fetishist conception of culture: in this view culture is independent from humans.

People may enter or exit the culture but it continues to exist. This is to view these aspects and cultures in general as meta-historical and non-personal transcendence. Parekh adopts an apologetic, closet-relativist stance.

A culture may deprive women from a decent life in this world but reserve the best seats and suites for them in the heaven. Habermas, on the other hand, tries to reconcile the liberal notions of rights and individuality with cultural rights through what he calls intersubjectivity.

However, the Kantian notion of autonomy and the idea of free association of individuals on the basis of natural law to which he appeals are in contrast to his effort. First, this Kantian notion is based on the idea of finalized, self-contained, autonomous subject, which is an atom-like entity.

Second, the notion of intersubjectivity that is based on Kantian autonomy presumes that the autonomous subjects the contract among which amount to intersubjective relations are equal, that is, it assumes they represent equal social positions. This latter supposition is empirically falsified. Culture is produced socially, but this does not mean that all the members of that culture have an equal share in producing, appropriating, and reproducing that culture.

The inherent inequality that is produced and reproduced within society and in ideational realms is thus transferred onto inter-cultural realm. The example that Habermas uses and his elaborations on societies, communities, and cultures depict his culture-fetishist outlook.

He considers societies and cultures as subjects that survive beyond the conflicts they get involved in. In other words, cultures, nations, communities, ethnicities, etc are considered as in-itself entities that will later acquire self-recognition through conflicts and become for-itself entities.

The conflict between cultures, at points, is the inevitable consequence of their in-itself existences. Thus, ideologies such as nationalism and ethnicism, for Habermas, are political expression of self-recognition of nations and ethnic communities. However, a quick look at the history of nations and national states, past or present-day, show that nations and ethnicities in particular and identities in general are products of ideologies such as nationalism, ethnicism, and sectarianism.

From France in eighteenth century to dissolution of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, former Soviet Union, and Iraq we witness the process of identity-constructing by competing political movements, which are the political expression of social movements in class societies. If socialization that Habermas has in view is a real dialectical process the resulting identity of such a process will be subject to perpetual change; that is, such an identity will change to the extent that the context within which the subject acts intersubjectively changes.

In response to political aspects of identity politics Fraser distinguishes between two modes of politics: transformative and affirmative. The need to be recognized as a nation-state is intensified in times of crisis, when the populace clings to the ascriptive signs of a regressively revitalized collective identity, as for instance after the dissolution of the Soviet empire. This kind of support offers dubious compensation for well-founded fears about the future and lack of social stability.

On the other hand, national independence is often to be had only at the price of civil wars, new kinds of repression, or ensuing problems that perpetuate the initial conflicts with the signs reversed.

According to Fraser, affirmative approach to culture redresses disrespect toward certain groups by demanding respect for them leaving the content of these cultures intact.

Transformation, on the other hand, is related to deconstruction. In its most radical form and when taken to its logical extremes, multiculturalism is pushed to challenge and reject all those social values that make the realization and actualization of human rights possible.

Multiculturalist approach to humans, not as individual persons but as representatives of particular structures, represents a retreat from the notion of citizenship and the rights and the attributes of the citizen. In general, according to Fraser, the transformative approach tends to destabilize existing identities so as to make room for future regroupments. What is ironic in this approach is that it considers groupments a deliberative decision of some kind.

This is the replica of contract theories that forms the basis of liberalist notion of natural right. Even class, in this view, is but another form of groupments, a form of deliberative identity. Socialism, at least its Marxian form, does not demand abolishing the class as a moral or purely political request if there is anything as pure politics. Rather, it states that classes disappear as the money economy, which is the expression of commodification of labor, is abolished.

On the one hand, she seems to admit that relations of production are the determining factor that produces and reproduces the present-day identities such as race, ethnicity, and gender. In other words, race, gender, ethnicity, etc come to be despite the existing social order and relations of production. In this, they are not social but are cultural. Thus, she ends up attributing eternality and meta-historicalness to culture. The question, according to Young, is that why Fraser reduces these five categories to two?

Young claims that recognition is means to economic and social equality and freedom , She is aware of the need for a holistic monist materialist theory of social movements. However, her formulation above is far from fulfilling this need. Young states that because the source of oppression against identities and groups and the source of inequality between communities are cultural, the solution should also be cultural.

Hence, she arrives at the necessity of the politics of difference , However, she ignores that identity-making is the consequence of such unequal social order.

The imagery that is attributed to certain groups, e. Thus, the only alternative is not adopting a politics of difference; an egalitarian position can also be adopted.

Politics of difference reproduces the imagery of the dominant discriminative politics. Young criticizes Fraser for polarizing political economy and culture.

Young treats culture as sui generis, as an end-in-itself. This view considers society as a crowd of some people that happen to have certain features such as skin color, eye color, and hair color in common. The difference between society, as put forward by this view, and nature is only nominal.

She advocates protecting indigenous economy as a transformative power confronting capitalism , Young views both culture and economy through fetishist lenses. Multiculturalism sanctifies these categories. In this way, people are left to the mercy of the arbitrary rules and regulations that are dictated by these structures, 19 which, in turn, means that they are left to the mercy of those who assume higher and more powerful positions within these frames.

Neither, it is concerned with the socio-historical roots and political significance of Islamic veiling etc. It says nothing to prevent Muslim families and communities from imposing veil upon their children. The political and social consequences of the politics that Young advocates are indicative of her theoretical stance.

Conclusion Iraqization of society is the necessary logical outcome of multiculturalist theses. In other words, what has been realized through American invasion of Iraq, that is, dividing the Iraqi society into ethnic, sectarian, and tribal factions, has in fact happened in concordance to the multiculturalist depiction of every human society.

In this picture people are not citizens that have certain equal rights and duties regardless of their sex and race but are members of this or that ethnicity, religion, sect, tribe, linguistic community etc.

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And as it is clear from the example of Iraq, women and children, as the most vulnerable sections of society are the first hand, immediate victims of such categorization. In short, multiculturalism, despite its radical and humanitarian self- depiction, justifies, advocates and actively supports the most reactionary ideologies and activities in the name of defending cultures, traditions and cultural values.

The answer should be searched within the present day needs of capitalism, on the one hand, and the politico-historical dead-end of capitalism, which is represented in form of reactionism and reactionary backlashes, on the other hand. Multiculturalism and cultural relativism should not be considered in relation to immediate economic benefits. As a matter of fact, the relation between economic substructure and the political and ideological superstructure is not a direct one; politics is the actualized viewpoint of a class that is concretized in form of a certain horizon and particular demands.

The universality of the values that is attributed to human being is based on the simple fact of humanity of that particular person —as simple as the fact that he or she is born to human society. This principle may also be extended to embrace the organic life of non-human animals, if one wishes. However, this value cannot be universalized so that it embraces all artifacts and human products —be it physical or ideational. Such transcription is both logically and actually illegitimate.

An axe, at a particular moment, may be more valuable than a bow or vice versa. Even when it comes to human personality and consciousness, there may be traits of behavior that are unacceptable. For instance, the right to life of a convict should be guaranteed; however, this cannot be simply transcribed to the acceptability of the behavior that has resulted in his or her conviction. If culture is not considered a thing-in-itself but a product of human activity, then one cannot make such a demand or presumption based on the aforementioned liberal principle.

Humans, supposedly, ought to respect other persons. However, they cannot be expected to respect whatever values a person has or produces. Principle of equal respect also requires conceiving humans as the author of the laws and regulations they submit to—of course, this is true ideally only, if people enjoy an actual state of equality.

This means that humans not only deserve respect, but also are answerable with regard to their activities and whatever they create and produce. Taylor and multiculturalists assume that whatever is produced within a culture is the private property of that culture. Both sides of the debate assume that the products of a group of people belong to that group or to their alleged genetic successors and not to humanity.

Liberal abstract universalism and multicultural particularism meet at this conjunction. Blum is aware that no particular aspect or a group of aspects can be attributed as the element s of defining and determining cultures. However, he chooses to valorize this ambiguity or vagueness by promoting it to a theoretical level. Blum also claims, recognition need involves no evaluative judgment at all, nor is it particularly appropriate, or even natural, to engage in assessing the culture of the student or 1 This is quoted in Taylor , I report it only because it captures a widespread attitude, which is, of course, why the story had currency in the first place.

In other words, the passage from respecting the dignity of the individual to respecting culture is illegitimate. Yet, Blum ignores that such a demand for valorization is implicit in the politics of identity.

Recognition can simply mean acknowledging the existence of a culture as an artifact and further acknowledging that that artifact has some value for someone. Consequently, Blum, unwillingly it may be, arrives at a relativist stance , Ironically, relativism goes hand in hand with the idea that cultures have equal worth.

Rather, he states that we should not only acknowledge a culture but also should respect the ways of life that are dictated by that culture. This last aspect is identical with the practical outcome of cultural relativism. Thus, he arrives at the demand for coexistence of cultures, which are neither equal nor unequal. Blum suggests leaving them to exist, as if they are immovable, self-contained architectonics.

The debate about valorization of culture is in response to the problem of producing demeaning imagery of certain groups. The source of demeaning self-imagery is the automatic attribution of a certain identity to a person. Mostly, the presumed identity is based on stereotypes that yield such demeaning imagery. Rather, it is a practice of certain human beings that should be criticized and banned as it is part of a misogynist, discriminative human activity.

For multiculturalists such a case would be a deadlock because they do not consider culture a product of human activity. Rather, they assign a sui generis existence and an internal worth to cultures.

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In the absence of a concept of culture as product of human practice one ends up in either approving such a practice or in using it as a source of forming demeaning imagery about those particular people. One could also covertly approve this practice by relativizing valorization of practices. This is how multiculturalism contributes to the reproduction of demeaning self-imagery of members of a society. Guiliana Prato also draws attention to the illegitimacy and political dangers of attributing the rights of the individual to communities or cultures.

He states that both Gutmann and Tamir are critical of bestowing rights on collectivities or communities, since such attribution of rights to groups forms a threat to individual 8 freedoms.

Multicultural recognition is inherently limited in two other interrelated ways: First, abstract—contentless view of culture, which may be conceived as reified or fetishist view of culture. Second, multiculturalism regards culture as immutable. Habermas claims that liberalism and social-democracy can overcome this tension, or at least they suggest an affirmative answer to this tension. Despite his proper formulation of the question, Habermas falls short in articulating the real reasons behind such tension.

Liberalism, traditionally, attributes rights to the individual because it considers individual as a self-contained, autonomous entity.

Thus, the duty of the state and of political society, theoretically and ideally speaking, is to protect these rights of the individuals. If there is a tension between the social and the individual, it should be resolved in the benefit of the individual.

This follows from the traditional liberal stance that contrasts the individual and the social. Society, in this classical picture, is an association of free individuals, just as any meaningful generalization is an association of atomic impressions and ideas. So be the case, rights of the individual cannot coherently be attributed to the social. In order to surmount this difficulty, a naturalistic notion of society is introduced. Thus follows the culturist views that propose the one-sided determination of the individual by the social, i.

Yet, the attempts of theorizing such determinism will vary form thinker to thinker.

Where Taylor formulates the tension between the individual and the social as an opposition between theory of rights and cultural differences and then tends to resolve it with reference to dialogicality of the individual, Habermas proposes that the two are compatible and intends to resolve the aforementioned tension with reference to notions of authorship of the law and intersubjectivity. In the final analysis, the process of socialization is external to the subject, which implies that the subject is conceived as an entity independent of society and sociality.

Thus, the tension between the individual and the social remains unresolved. Although he warns about the conceptual complexities that may result from confusing these phenomena, Habermas treats all of them as if they belong to the same level of abstraction: nation, as well as culture is confined with gender, which is biologically determined. And all these are being related to the just cause of struggling against colonialism.

Habermas considers nation and culture as sui generis entities. Inequalities, therefore, are not product of cultures and neither exclusive to a number of them —say minority cultures.

Inequalities, alongside other qualities and social relations are being continuously produced; cultures are the carriers of inequalities inherited from the past, say, discrimination against certain communities and their members, and not the demiurges of these inequalities.

Inequality in this view is just a matter of getting advantage of something and not a matter of produced and reproduced social relations. Does Kymlicka suggest any other solution than reliance on the mercy of the dominants? And what is the source of such a mercy if it exists at all?

It is then implied that the dominant culture that is endowed with liberal values promotes the individuality and independence of persons, that is, the dominant, liberal culture is so structured that it submits to its own instantiation, while, when it comes to the disadvantaged cultures, they are so conceived that they do not attribute independence to the person, which is its instantiation or embodiment. In other words, members of liberal cultures are independent and liberal, members of disadvantaged cultures or non-liberal cultures are non-liberal and disadvantaged.

Notwithstanding the obvious determinism of this account, as a well-intentioned member of liberal culture he assumes the right to first submit the right of the individuals and the cultures to enjoy certain rights and privileges, and second, he assumes the right to decide what element should be preserved in certain cultures with reference to liberal cultural standards.

In this view language, history, and culture are treated on the same footing: 1. Kymlicka simply ignores the fact that neither of the aforementioned has any reality and significance independent from social relations. Moreover, at a more particular level, these differences acquire political significance because they have been made politically, that is, they acquire political significance within the framework of modern capitalist society, for instance, in the process of nation-formation.

In this, it turns into the justification of the status-quo. The point, however, is to explain this diversity and differentiation. They claim that the tendency of economic growth is independent of social structure ; that is, it is rooted in human nature and human situation.

Pull, push, pipes: sustainable capital flows for a new world order - speech by Mark Carney

The point, however, is to explain the phenomena of poverty and wealth and the reality of this very stratification. Her main thesis is that justice requires both redistribution and recognition , Both traditional left and Fraser view the social world as fragmented and divided into identities.

Political movements, in this view, are the expression of the struggle of identities toward realization of their rights, just as for Taylor and liberal multiculturalists politics is the expression of a culture. Consequently, Fraser aims at providing a theory that functions as a magical agglutinating device.

According to Fraser recognition promotes the putative specificity of a group while redistribution aims at abolishing the economic base of group specificity , Thus follows the redistribution-recognition dilemma. Class, for Fraser, first and foremost, is but another form of identity that, due to goodwill of redistribution politicians, ought to be abolished. Moreover, it is a conglomeration of individual labor-force sellers. This is to view the class through individual bourgeois lenses as a fetish that is best expressed in trade unionism.

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This view does not consider class a social relation but as a physical-mechanical relation of some end-products, that is, workers. According to this view exploitation takes place in the workshop only. With the same token, a worker is not exploited when he or she is asleep or when she or he is unemployed. Following the same path of reasoning one can say that human being is not alienated as a result of existing mode of production which is a social relation, because human beings are distributed through out the entire class structure of capitalist society.

This view fails to see that society itself is the very product of relations of production and is thus a social relation. All relations, roles, inequalities, and injustices are continuously produced and reproduced within the existing society and are parts of social relations.

Certain inequalities, for instance sexual discrimination, may be rooted in 12 and inherited from past. However, this does not make sexual discrimination an archaic problem; sexual discrimination is produced at present, under capitalist mode of production and thus the struggle against such discrimination is an aspect of class struggle. It is no longer a question of religious interests as such. Fraser, to the contrary, conceives both class and culture as atomic things in themselves.

The immediate response to sexual or any other form of discrimination is abolishing discrimination and construing reverse discrimination if necessary.

The speculative thinker reduces the real entities into manifestations of an essence, which is arrived at through mere abstraction. Reifying this abstract idea as the substance, the real thing appears as its semblances. The multitude of the real being is explained as the manifestation of the self-movement of the substance—the real becomes a mode of this substance only.

The political-economic view of capital as self-generating wealth and the idea of culture, not as the totality and ever-changing products of human activity but as a self-contained fetish, are among other examples of such an outlook.

If culture determines, in the way multiculturalist claim it does, the being of its members, then how the diversity within one culture is to be explained? How come, say, I am different than my fellow culture-mate? Notwithstanding the enigma why Culture manifests this self-movement in the form of culture, at other times in the form of individual person. Perhaps, some Medieval-type theory of emanation is at work.

Multiculturalism divides and categorizes people illegitimately and unjustifiably. In this view, the idea of human rights regardless of certain historical and social attributes is not plausible.

This is to say that, in multiculturalist view humans do not have human identity per se, and neither have they human rights. Culture as a political phenomenon is the product of culturist movements just as nation is the product of nationalism.

Culturism, in most of the cases, is a covert form of particularist, localist, nationalist, religious, or ethnicist politics. Ontologically speaking, culture does not exist independent from human activity. Culture is not a sui generis entity. Regardless of this dependency, culture, in the hand of culturist movements, is made into an imaginary self-contained entity that has the ability to mobilize groups of people in service of certain terrestrial benefits.

The alleged essentiality of culture and its appearance in the political scene as a political entity does not make it ontologically self- contained; culture does not become an in-itself entity just as nation does not become an itself entity and never loses its socio-historical determinations despite the claims and wishes of the nationalist movements. Attributing essentiality to culture out of goodwill reproduces this reified image of culture as a permanent, in-itself entity, and consequently, voluntarily or involuntarily, contributes to strengthening of culturist ideology and political position.

The rest of Canada saw that the distinct society clause legitimated collective goals. Societies, accordingly, have characters that determine what kind of rights and what type of system of governance should be chosen for them. Clearly, Taylor reproduces the aforementioned culturist stance that takes politics to be the reflection of culture. Taylor eventually defends political Islam and its totalitarian politics, because such politics is the political expression of another culture.

Liberalism is not the common ground upon which cultures of different range can meet; however, this does not exclude the right of these non-liberal cultures to practice their undesirable ways in their own societies. Hence follows the peaceful coexistence of cultures. All in all, in order to justify this implicit defense of political Islam and its totalitarian regimes, which is the inevitable result of viewing politics as nothing but the expression of culture, Taylor claims that liberalism is the product and continuation of Christianity and Christian culture.

The picture is complete: Christian religion yields to Christian Culture which finds its expression in liberalism and a half-hearted defense of basic human rights.

On the contrary, Islam yields to Islamic culture, the political expression of which is political Islam and its totalitarian regimes. In the attitude of the Jews to the Christian world he could see only the attitude of the Jewish religion to the Christian religion What we are combating in Bauer's criticism is precisely speculation reproducing itself as a caricature. There is no place for productive and reproductive activity in this definition.

Culture is a historically given ready-made goods. Such depiction is a fetishist conception of culture: in this view culture is independent from humans. People may enter or exit the culture but it continues to exist. This is to view these aspects and cultures in general as meta-historical and non-personal transcendence. Parekh adopts an apologetic, closet-relativist stance. A culture may deprive women from a decent life in this world but reserve the best seats and suites for them in the heaven.

Habermas, on the other hand, tries to reconcile the liberal notions of rights and individuality with cultural rights through what he calls intersubjectivity.

However, the Kantian notion of autonomy and the idea of free association of individuals on the basis of natural law to which he appeals are in contrast to his effort.

First, this Kantian notion is based on the idea of finalized, self-contained, autonomous subject, which is an atom-like entity. Second, the notion of intersubjectivity that is based on Kantian autonomy presumes that the autonomous subjects the contract among which amount to intersubjective relations are equal, that is, it assumes they represent equal social positions.

This latter supposition is empirically falsified. Culture is produced socially, but this does not mean that all the members of that culture have an equal share in producing, appropriating, and reproducing that culture. The inherent inequality that is produced and reproduced within society and in ideational realms is thus transferred onto inter-cultural realm. The example that Habermas uses and his elaborations on societies, communities, and cultures depict his culture-fetishist outlook.

He considers societies and cultures as subjects that survive beyond the conflicts they get involved in. In other words, cultures, nations, communities, ethnicities, etc are considered as in-itself entities that will later acquire self-recognition through conflicts and become for-itself entities.

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