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Each of these aspects requires elaboration. Nations and national identity may be defined in terms of common origin, ethnicity, or cultural ties, and while an individual's membership in the nation is often regarded as involuntary, it is sometimes regarded as voluntary. The degree of care for one's nation that nationalists require is often, but not always, taken to be very high: according to such views, the claims of one's nation take precedence over rival contenders for authority and loyalty see Berlin , Smith , Levy , and the discussion in Gans ; for a more extreme characterization see the opening pages of Crosby , and for a recent rich and interesting discussions of nationalist attitudes see Yack Although sovereignty is often taken to mean full statehood Gellner , ch. Despite these definitional worries, there is a fair amount of agreement about the historically paradigmatic form of nationalism. It typically features the supremacy of the nation's claims over other claims to individual allegiance and full sovereignty as the persistent aim of its political program.

Nationalisms in this wider sense can vary somewhat in their conceptions of the nation which are often left implicit in their discourse , in the grounds for and degree of its value, and in the scope of their prescribed obligations.

The term can also be applied to other cases not covered by classical nationalism, for instance to the hypothetical pre-state political forms that an ethnic identity might take.

The variations of nationalism most relevant for philosophy are those that influence the moral standing of claims and of recommended nationalist practices. The central theoretical nationalist evaluative claims can be charted on the map of possible positions within political theory in the following useful but somewhat simplified and schematic way.

Nationalist claims featuring the nation as central to political action must answer two crucial general questions.

First, is there one kind of large social group smaller than the whole of mankind that is of special moral importance? The nationalist answer is that there is just one, namely, the nation. When an ultimate choice is to be made, the nation has priority.

This answer is implied by rather standard definitions of nationalism offered by Berlin, discussed in Section 1. Are they based on voluntary or involuntary membership in the group? The typical contemporary nationalist thinker opts for the latter, while admitting that voluntary endorsement of one's national identity is a morally important achievement.

On the philosophical map, pro-nationalist normative tastes fit nicely with the communitarian stance in general: most pro-nationalist philosophers are communitarians who choose the nation as the preferred community in contrast to those of their fellow communitarians who prefer more far-ranging communities, such as those defined by global religious traditions.

However, some writers who describe themselves as liberal nationalists, prominently including Will Kymlicka , , , reject communitarian underpinning. Before proceeding to moral claims, let me briefly sketch the issues and viewpoints connected to territory and territorial rights that are essential for nationalist political programs. I am adapting the excellent taxonomy of A. Kollers , Ch. Why is territory important for ethno-national groups, and what are the extent and grounds of territorial rights?

Its primary importance resides in sovereignty and all the associated possibilities for internal control and external exclusion. What about the grounds for the demand for territorial rights?

Nationalist and pro-nationalist views mostly rely on the attachment that members of a nation have to national territory and to the formative value of territory for a nation to justify territorial claims see Miller and Meissels , with some refinements discussed below. These attachment views stand in stark contrast to more pragmatic views about territorial rights as means for conflict resolution e. Another quite popular alternative is the family of individualistic views grounding territorial rights in rights and interests of individuals, for instance in their human rights Buchanan , pre-political Lockean property rights Simmons , individual resource rights Steiner , or political association rights Wellman Some of the authors mentioned are cosmopolitan critics of nationalism, most prominently Buchanan and Pogge.

We shall first describe the very heart of the nationalist program, i. These claims can be seen as answers to the normative subset of our initial questions about 1 pro-national attitudes and 2 actions. We will see that these claims recommend various courses of action: centrally, those meant to secure and sustain a political organization — preferably a state — for the given ethno-cultural national community thereby making more specific the answers to our normative questions 1e , 1f , 2b , and 2c.

Finally, we shall discuss various lines of pro-nationalist thought that have been put forward in defense of these claims. To begin, let us return to the claims concerning the furthering of the national state and culture.

These are proposed by the nationalist as norms of conduct. The philosophically most important variations concern three aspects of such normative claims: i The normative nature and strength of the claim: does it promote merely a right say, to have and maintain a form of political self-government, preferably and typically a state, or have cultural life centered upon a recognizably ethno-national culture , or a moral obligation to get and maintain one , or a moral, legal and political obligation?

The strongest claim is typical of classical nationalism; its typical norms are both moral and, once the nation-state is in place, legally enforceable obligations for all parties concerned, including for the individual members of the ethno-nation.

The force of the nationalist claim is here being weighed against the force of other claims, including those of individual or group interests or rights. Variations in comparative strength of nationalist claims take place on a continuum between two extremes. At one rather unpalatable extreme, nation-focused claims take precedence over any other claims, including over human rights.

Further towards the center is the classical nationalism that gives nation-centered claims precedence over individual interests and many needs including pragmatic collective utility , but not necessarily over general human rights.

See, for example, McIntyre , Oldenquist On the opposite end, which is mild, humane and liberal, the central nationalist claims are accorded prima facie status only see Tamir , Gans , and most recently Miller's book, which looks for a compromise.

What is their scope? One approach claims that they are valid for every ethno-nation and thereby universal. To put it more officially Universalizing nationalism is the political program that claims that every ethno-nation should have a state that it should rightfully own and the interests of which it should promote.

The most difficult and indeed chauvinistic sub-case of particularism, i. Classical nationalism comes in both particularistic and universalistic varieties. Although the three dimensions of variation — internal strength, comparative strength, and scope — are logically independent, they are psychologically and politically intertwined. People who are radical in one respect tend also to be radical in other respects. In other words, certain clusters of attitudes appear to be most stable, so that extreme or moderate attitudes on one dimension psychologically and politically belong with extreme or moderate ones on others.

Pairing extreme attitudes on one dimension with moderate ones on the others is psychologically and socially unstable. Put starkly, the view is that morality ends at the boundaries of the nation-state; beyond there is nothing but anarchy. The view is explicit in Friederich Meinecke , Introduction and Raymond Aron and very close to the surface in Hans Morgenthau ; for interesting links with contemporary nationalisms, see the paper by Michael C. Williams and the book edited by Duncan Bell It nicely complements the main classical nationalist claim about nation-state, i.

Is national partiality justified, and to what extent? What actions are appropriate to bring about sovereignty? In particular, are ethno-national states and institutionally protected ethno- national cultures goods independent from the individual will of their members, and how far may one go in protecting them? The philosophical debate for and against nationalism is a debate about the moral validity of its central claims.

In particular the ultimate moral issue is the following: is any form of nationalism morally permissible or justified, and, if not, how bad are particular forms of it? For debates on partiality in general, see Chatterjee and Smith and, more recently, Feltham and Cottingham Why do nationalist claims require a defense? In some situations they seem plausible: for instance, the plight of some stateless national groups — the history of Jews and Armenians, the historical and contemporary misfortunes of Kurds — lends credence to the idea that having their own state would have solved the worst problems.

Still, there are good reasons to examine nationalist claims more carefully. The most general reason is that it should first be shown that the political form of nation state has some value as such, that a national community has a particular, or even central, moral and political value, and that claims in its favor have normative validity.

Once this is established, a further defense is needed. Some classical nationalist claims appear to clash — at least under normal circumstances of contemporary life — with various values that people tend to accept. Some of these values are considered essential to liberal-democratic societies, while others are important specifically for the flourishing of creativity and culture. The main values in the first set are individual autonomy and benevolent impartiality most prominently towards members of groups culturally different from one's own.

The alleged special duties towards one's ethno-national culture can and often do interfere with individuals' right to autonomy. Also, construed too strictly these duties can interfere with other individual rights, e. Many feminist authors have noted that the typical nationalist suggestion that women have a moral obligation to give birth to new members of the nation and to nurture them for the sake of the nation clashes with both the autonomy and the privacy of these women Yuval-Davis , Moller-Okin , and , and the discussion in the volume on Okin, Satz et al.

Another endangered value is diversity within the ethno-national community, which can also be thwarted by the homogeneity of a central national culture. Nation-oriented duties also interfere with the value of unconstrained creativity. For example, telling writers, musicians or philosophers that they have a special duty to promote national heritage interferes with the freedom of creation.

The question here is not whether these individuals have the right to promote their national heritage, but whether they have a duty to do so. Between these two sets of endangered values, the autonomy-centered and creativity-centered ones, fall values that seem to arise from ordinary needs of people living under ordinary circumstances Barry In many modern states, citizens of different ethnic background live together and very often value this kind of life.

The very fact of cohabitation seems to be a good that should be upheld. Nationalism does not tend to foster this kind of multiculturalism and pluralism, judging from both theory especially the classical nationalist one and experience. But the problems get worse. In practice, it does not seem accidental that the invidious particularistic form of nationalism, claiming rights for one's own people and denying them to others, is so widespread. The source of the problem is the competition for scarce resources: as Ernst Gellner famously pointed out, there is too little territory for all candidate ethnic groups to have a state, and the same goes for other goods demanded by nationalists for the exclusive use of their co-nationals.

According to some authors McCabe , the invidious variant is more coherent than any other form of nationalism: if one values one's own ethnic group highly the simplest way is to value it tout court. If one definitely prefers one's own culture in all respects to any foreign one, it is a waste of time and attention to bother about others.

The universalist, non-invidious variant introduces enormous psychological and political complications. These arise from a tension between spontaneous attachment to one's own community and the demand to regard all communities with an equal eye. This tension might make the humane, non-invidious position psychologically unstable, difficult to uphold in situations of conflict and crisis, and politically less efficient.

Philosophers sympathetic to nationalism are aware of the evils that historical nationalism has produced and usually distance themselves from these. In order to help the reader find his or her way through this involved debate, we shall briefly summarize the considerations which are open to the ethno-nationalist to defend his or her case. Compare the useful overview in Lichtenberg Further lines of thought built upon these considerations can be used to defend very different varieties of nationalism, from radical to very moderate ones.

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It is important to offer a warning concerning the key assumptions and premises figuring in each of the lines of thought summarized below: namely, that the assumptions often live an independent life in the philosophical literature. Some of them figure in the proposed defenses of various traditional views which have little to do with the concept of a nation in particular.

For brevity, I shall reduce each line of thought to a brief argument; the actual debate is more involved than one can represent in a sketch. I shall indicate, in brackets, some prominent lines of criticism that have been put forward in the debate. These are discussed in greater detail in Miscevic The main arguments in favor of nationalism purporting to establish its fundamental claims about state and culture will be divided into two sets.

The first set of arguments defends the claim that national communities have a high value, often seen as non-instrumental and independent of the wishes and choices of their individual members, and argues that they should therefore be protected by means of state and official statist policies. The first set will be presented here in more detail, since it has formed the core of the debate.

It depicts the community as the deep source of value or as the unique transmission device connecting its members to some important values. Here is a characterization. The deep communitarian perspective is a theoretical perspective on political issues in the case under consideration, on nationalism that justifies a given political arrangement here, a nation-state by appeal to deep philosophical assumptions about human nature, language, community ties and identity in a deeper, philosophical sense.

The general form of deep communitarian arguments is as follows. First, the communitarian premise: there is some uncontroversial good e. Then comes the claim that the ethno-cultural nation is the kind of community ideally suited for this task. Unfortunately, this crucial claim is rarely defended in detail in the literature. But here is a sample from Margalit, whose last sentence has been already quoted above: The idea is that people make use of different styles to express their humanity.

The styles are generally determined by the communities to which they belong. The conclusion of this type of argument is that the ethno-national community has the right to an ethno-national state and the citizens of the state have the right and obligation to favor their own ethnic culture in relation to any other.

Although the deeper philosophical assumptions in the arguments stem from the communitarian tradition, weakened forms have also been proposed by more liberal philosophers. The original communitarian lines of thought in favor of nationalism suggest that there is some value in preserving ethno-national cultural traditions, in feelings of belonging to a common nation, and in solidarity between a nation's members. A liberal nationalist might claim that these are not the central values of political life but are values nevertheless.

Moreover, the diametrically opposing views, pure individualism and cosmopolitanism, do seem arid, abstract, and unmotivated by comparison. By cosmopolitanism I shall understand a moral and political doctrine of the following sort: Cosmopolitanism is the view that one's primary moral obligations are directed to all human beings regardless of geographical or cultural distance , and political arrangements should faithfully reflect this universal moral obligation in the form of supra-statist arrangements that take precedence over nation-states.

Critics of cosmopolitanism sometimes argue that these two claims are incoherent, since human beings generally strive best under some global institutional arrangement like ours that concentrates power and authority at the level of states.

Confronted with opposing forces of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, many philosophers opt for a mixture of liberalism-cosmopolitanism and patriotism-nationalism. In his writings B. Hilary Putnam proposes loyalty to what is best in the multiple traditions in which each of us participates, apparently a middle way between a narrow-minded patriotism and an overly abstract cosmopolitanism ibid, The compromise has been foreshadowed by Berlin , and Taylor , and its various versions worked out in considerable detail by authors such as Yael Tamir , David Miller , , , Kai Nielsen , Michel Seymour and Chaim Gans See also the debate around Miller's work in De Schutter and Tinnevelt In the last two decades it has occupied center stage in the debate and even provoked re-readings of historical nationalism in its light, for instance in Miller a , Sung Ho Kim or Brian Vick Most liberal nationalist authors accept various weakened versions of the arguments we list below, taking them to support moderate or ultra-moderate nationalist claims.

It is important to mention here a more utopian proposal due to Chandran Kukathas , which nicely combines multicultural pluralism with the distinctiveness of particular communities that classical nationalism celebrates.

Some of these individual islands might be quite unpleasant by liberal standards; what makes the archipelago liberal overall is that each community guarantees its dissenting members the right to exit which might have a high price, if former members have nowhere to go with any prospect for a decent life. The first level of political organization might thus be non-liberal Kukathas hopes it will not turn out to be so , while the second level would be strongly liberal.

The proposal nicely combines the traditional features of classical nationalism with very liberal, almost anarchic traits of the whole. Unfortunately, it is hard to see what would keep such an archipelago together without a strong unifying state, which Kukathas would not have. A clear danger is a slide towards a multipolar achipelago, with some big and powerful islands say, a huge Islamic island, a huge EU-type island, and so on. Let me return to the main line of exposition.

Here are the main weakenings of classical ethno-nationalism that liberal, limited-liberal and cosmopolitan nationalists propose. First, ethno-national claims have only prima facie strength, and cannot trump individual rights.

Second, legitimate ethno-national claims do not in themselves automatically amount to the right to a state, but rather to the right to a certain level of cultural autonomy. The main models of autonomy are either territorial or non-territorial: the first involves territorial devolution; the second, cultural autonomy granted to individuals regardless of their domicile within the state.

Third, ethno-nationalism is subordinate to civic patriotism, which has little or nothing to do with ethnic criteria. Finally, any legitimacy that ethno-national claims may have is to be derived from choices the concerned individuals are free to make.

The first argument depends on assumptions that also appear in the subsequent ones, but it further ascribes to the community an intrinsic value. The later arguments point more towards an instrumental value of nation, derived from the value of individual flourishing, moral understanding, firm identity and the like. Each ethno-national community is valuable in and of itself since it is only within the natural encompassing framework of various cultural traditions that important meanings and values are produced and transmitted.

The members of such communities share a special cultural proximity to each other. By speaking the same language and sharing customs and traditions, the members of these communities are typically closer to one another in various ways than they are to those who don't share the same culture. The community thereby becomes a network of morally connected agents, i. A prominent obligation of each individual concerns the underlying traits of the ethnic community, above all language and customs: they ought to be cherished, protected, preserved and reinforced.

The general assumption that moral obligations increase with cultural proximity is often criticized as problematic. Moreover, even if we grant this general assumption in theory, it breaks down in practice.

Nationalist activism is most often turned against close and substantially similar neighbors rather than against distant strangers, so that in many important contexts the appeal to proximity will not work. It might, however, retain its potential force against culturally distant groups. The ethno-national community is essential for each of its members to flourish. In particular, it is only within such a community that an individual can acquire concepts and values crucial for understanding the community's cultural life in general and the individual's own life in particular.

There has been much debate on the pro-nationalist side about whether divergence of values is essential for separateness of national groups. Taylor , concluded that it is not separateness of value that matters. Critics of nationalism point out that flourishing might have too high a price, especially in the form of aggressiveness towards neighbors.

Communitarian philosophers emphasize nurture over nature as the principal force determining our identity as people — we come to be who we are because of the social settings and contexts in which we mature.

This claim certainly has some plausibility. For example, Nielsen writes: We are, to put it crudely, lost if we cannot identify ourselves with some part of an objective social reality: a nation, though not necessarily a state, with its distinctive traditions.

What we find in people — and as deeply embedded as the need to develop their talents — is the need not only to be able to say what they can do but to say who they are. This is found, not created, and is found in the identification with others in a shared culture based on nationality or race or religion or some slice or amalgam thereof…. Under modern conditions, this securing and nourishing of a national consciousness can only be achieved with a nation-state that corresponds to that national consciousness , Given that an individual's morality depends upon their having a mature and stable personal identity, the communal conditions that foster the development of personal identity must be preserved and encouraged.

For the opposite line, denying the importance of fixed and homogenous identity and proposing hybrid identities, see the papers in Iyall Smith and Leavy Philosophical nationalists claim that the nation is the right format for preserving and encouraging such identity-providing communities.

Therefore, communal life should be organized around particular national cultures. The classical nationalist proposes that cultures should be given their own states, while the liberal nationalist proposes that cultures should get at least some form of political protection. A particularly important variety of value is moral value. Some values are universal, e.

The nation offers a natural framework for moral traditions, and thereby for moral understanding; it is the primary school of morals. I note in fairness that Taylor himself is ambivalent about the national format of morality.

An often-noticed problem with this line of thought is that particular nations do not each have a special morality of their own. Each national culture contributes uniquely to the diversity of human cultures. We are forbidden to make judgments of comparative value, for that is measuring the incommensurable.

The argument from diversity is therefore pluralistic: it ascribes value to each particular culture from the viewpoint of the collective totality of cultures. Assuming that the ethno- nation is the natural unit of culture, the preservation of cultural diversity amounts to institutionally protecting the purity of ethno- national culture. A pragmatic inconsistency might threaten this argument. The issue is who can legitimately propose ethno-national diversity as ideal: the nationalist is much too tied to his or her own culture to do it, while the cosmopolitan is too eager to preserve intercultural links that go beyond the idea of having a single nation-state.

Moreover, is diversity a value such that it deserves to be protected whenever it exists? Should the protection of diversity be restricted to certain aspects of culture s proposed in full generality?

The line of thought 1 is not individualistic. And 5 can be presented without reference to individuals: diversity may be good in its own right, or may be good for nations. But the other lines of thought in the set just presented are all linked to the importance of community life in relation to the individual. In each argument, there is a general communitarian premise a community, to which one has no choice whether or not to belong, is crucial for one's identity, or for flourishing or some other important good.

This premise is coupled with the more narrow, nation-centered descriptive claim that the ethno-nation is precisely the kind of community ideally suited for the task. However, liberal nationalists do not find these arguments completely persuasive. In their view, the premises of the arguments may not support the full package of nationalist ambitions and may not be unconditionally valid.

For an even more skeptical view stemming from social science, see Hale Still, there is a lot to these arguments, and they might support liberal nationalism and a more modest stance in favor of national cultures.

We conclude this sub-section by pointing to an interesting and sophisticated pro-national stance that developed by David Miller over the course of decades, from his work of to the most recent work of He accepts multicultural diversity within a society but stresses an overarching national identity, taking as his prime example British national identity, which encompasses the English, Scottish and other ethnic identities.

Such identity is necessary for basic social solidarity, and it goes far beyond simple constitutional patriotism, Miller claims. A skeptic could note the following. However, multi-cultural states typically bring together groups with very different histories, languages, religions, even quite contrasting appearances.

One seems to have a dilemma. Grounding social solidarity in national identity requires the latter to be rather thin and seems likely to end up as full-on, unitary cultural identity. Thick constitutional patriotism may be the only possible attitude that can ground such solidarity while preserving the original cultural diversity. They appeal to actual or alleged circumstances that would make nationalist policies reasonable or permissible or even mandatory , such as a the fact that a large part of the world is organized into nation states so that each new group aspiring to create a nation-state just follows an established pattern , or b the circumstances of group self-defense or of redressing past injustice that might justify nationalist policies to take a special case.

Some of the arguments also present nationhood as conducive to important political goods, such as equality. A group of people of a sufficient size has a prima facie right to govern itself and decide its future membership, if the members of the group so wish. It is fundamentally the democratic will of the members themselves that grounds the right to an ethno-national state and to ethno-centric cultural institutions and practices.

This argument presents the justification of ethno- national claims as deriving from the will of the members of the nation. It is therefore highly suitable for liberal nationalism but not appealing to a deep communitarian who sees the demands of the nation as independent from, and prior to, the choices of particular individuals.

For extended discussion of this argument, see Buchanan , which has become a contemporary classic; Moore ; and Gans For some exchanges of arguments, see J. An interesting volume from a legal perspective is Kohen , and some interesting case studies are presented in Casertano For an extremely negative judgment see Yack , Ch. Oppression and injustice give the victimized group a just cause and the right to secede. If a minority group is oppressed by the majority to the extent that almost every minority member is worse off than most members of the majority simply in virtue of belonging to the minority, then nationalist claims on behalf of the minority are morally plausible and potentially compelling.

This argument implies a restrictive answer to our questions 2b and 2c : the use of force in order to achieve sovereignty is legitimate only in the cases of self-defense and redress. Of course, there is a whole lot of work to be done specifying against whom force may legitimately be used, and how much damage may be done to how many. It establishes a typical remedial right, acceptable from a liberal standpoint.

See the discussion in Kukathas and Poole , also Buchanan For past injustices see Waldron Members of a minority group are often disadvantaged in relation to a dominant culture because they have to rely on those with the same language and culture to conduct the affairs of daily life.

Since freedom to conduct one's daily life is a primary good, and it is difficult to change or give up reliance upon one's minority culture to attain that good, this reliance can lead to certain inequalities if special measures are not taken. Spontaneous nation-building by the majority has to be moderated. Therefore, liberal neutrality itself requires that the majority provide certain basic cultural goods, i. See Kymlicka b, and Institutional protections and the right to the minority group's own institutional structure are remedies that restore equality and turn the resulting nation-state into a more moderate multicultural one.

The degree of care for one's nation that nationalists require is often, but not always, taken to be very high: according to such views, the claims of one's nation take precedence over rival contenders for authority and loyalty see Berlin , Smith , Levy , and the discussion in Gans ; for a more extreme characterization see the opening pages of Crosby , and for a recent rich and interesting discussions of nationalist attitudes see Yack Although sovereignty is often taken to mean full statehood Gellner , ch.

Despite these definitional worries, there is a fair amount of agreement about the historically paradigmatic form of nationalism. It typically features the supremacy of the nation's claims over other claims to individual allegiance and full sovereignty as the persistent aim of its political program. Territorial sovereignty has traditionally been seen as a defining element of state power and essential for nationhood.

It was extolled in classic modern works by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau and is returning to center stage in the debate, though philosophers are now more skeptical see below. Issues surrounding the control of the movement of money and people in particular immigration and the resource rights implied in territorial sovereignty make the topic politically center in the age of globalization and philosophically interesting for nationalists and anti-nationalists alike.

This classical nationalism later spread across the world and still marks many contemporary nationalisms. In breaking down the issue, we have mentioned the importance of the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity.

This point raises two sorts of questions.

Nationalism

First, the descriptive ones: 1a What is a nation and what is national identity? Second, the normative ones: Is the attitude of caring about national identity always appropriate? This section discusses the descriptive questions, starting with 1a and 1b. The normative questions are addressed in Section 3 on the moral debate. If one wants to enjoin people to struggle for their national interests, one must have some idea about what a nation is and what it is to belong to a nation.

So, in order to formulate and ground their evaluations, claims, and directives for action, pro-nationalist thinkers have expounded theories of ethnicity, culture, nation and state.

Their opponents have in turn challenged these elaborations. Now, some presuppositions about ethnic groups and nations are essential for the nationalist, while others are theoretical elaborations designed to support the essential ones.

Since nationalism is particularly prominent with groups that do not yet have a state, a definition of nation and nationalism purely in terms of belonging to a state is a non-starter. This leaves two extreme options and a number of intermediates. The first extreme option has been put forward by a small but distinguished band of theorists, including Renan and Weber ; for a recent defense, see Brubaker and for a comparison with religion, Brubaker According to their purely voluntaristic definition, a nation is any group of people aspiring to a common political state-like organization.

At the other extreme, and more typically, nationalist claims are focused upon the non-voluntary community of common origin, language, tradition and culture: the classic ethno-nation is a community of origin and culture, including prominently a language and customs. Philosophical discussions centered around nationalism tend to concern the ethnic-cultural variants only, and this habit will be followed here. For the ethno- cultural nationalist it is one's ethnic-cultural background that determines one's membership in the community.

One cannot chose to be a member; instead, membership depends on the accident of origin and early socialization. However, commonality of origin has become mythical for most contemporary candidate groups: ethnic groups have been mixing for millennia.

This is the kind of definition that would be accepted by most parties in the debate today. So defined, the nation is a somewhat mixed category, both ethno-cultural and civic, but still closer to the purely ethno-cultural than to the purely civic extreme. The wider descriptive underpinnings of nationalist claims have varied over the last two centuries. For almost a century, up to the end of the Second World War, it was customary to link nationalist views to organic metaphors for society.

Most contemporary defenders of nationalism, especially philosophers, avoid such language. The organic metaphor and talk about character have been replaced by one master metaphor: that of national identity.

It is centered upon cultural membership, and used both for the identity of a group and for the socially based identity of its members, e. Various authors unpack the metaphor in various ways: some stress involuntary membership in the community, others the strength with which one identifies with the community, and yet others link it to the personal identity of each member of the community.

Seymour have significantly contributed to introducing and maintaining important topics such as community, membership, tradition and social identity into contemporary philosophical debate. In social and political science one usually distinguishes two kinds of views.

A volume dedicated to A. Smith debates his ethnno-nationalism Leouss and Grosby, eds. The second are the modernist views, placing the origin of nations in modern times. They can be further classified according to their answer to an additional question: how real is the ethno-cultural nation? The modernist realist view is that nations are real but distinctly modern creations, instrumental in the genesis of capitalism Gellner , Hobsbawn , and Breuilly and The realist view contrasts with more radical antirealism.

These divergent views seem to support rather divergent moral claims about nations: see for instance the collections edited by Breen and O'Neill and by Lecours and Moreno For an overview of nationalism in political theory see Vincent and the encyclopedic volume edited by Delanty and Kumar Indeed, older authors — from great thinkers like Herder and Otto Bauer to the propagandists who followed their footsteps — took great pains to ground normative claims upon firm ontological realism about nations: nations are real, bona fide entities.

See, for instance, MacCormick ; Miller , ; Tamir , Gans , Moore , , Dagger and, for an interesting discussion, Frost They point out that common imaginings can tie people together, and that actual interaction resulting from togetherness can engender important moral obligations.

Let us now turn to question 1c about the nature of pro-national attitudes. The explanatory issue that has interested political and social scientists concerns ethno-nationalist sentiment, the paradigm case of a pro-national attitude.

Is it as irrational, romantic and indifferent to self-interest as it might seem on the surface? The issue has divided authors who see nationalism as basically irrational and those who try to explain it as being in some sense rational. Authors who see it as irrational propose various explanations of why people assent to irrational views.

But where does such false consciousness come from? On the opposite side, the famous critic of nationalism Elie Kedourie thinks this irrationality is spontaneous. A decade ago Liah Greenfeld went as far as linking nationalism to mental illness in her provocative article; see also her book. On the opposite side, Michael Walzer has offered a sympathetic account of nationalist passion in his Authors relying upon the Marxist tradition offer various deeper explanations.

For an overview of Marxist approaches see Glenn Now we turn to those who see nationalist sentiments as being rational, at least in a very wide sense.

Some authors claim that it is often rational for individuals to become nationalists Hardin Consider the two sides of the nationalist coin. On the first side, identification and cohesion within an ethno-national group relates to inter-group cooperation, and cooperation is easier for those who are part of the same ethno-national group.

To take an example of ethnic ties in a multiethnic state, a Vietnamese newcomer to the United States will do well to rely on his co-nationals: common language, customs and expectations might help him a lot in finding his way in new surroundings. Once the ties are established and he has become part of a network, it is rational to go on cooperating, and ethnic sentiment secures the trust and the firm bond needed for smooth cooperation.

A further issue is when it is rational to switch sides; to stay with our example, when does it become profitable for our Vietnamese to develop an all-American patriotism? This has received a detailed elaboration in David Laitin , summarized in ; applied to language rights in Laitin and Reich ; see also Laitin , who uses material from the former Soviet Union. On the other side of the nationalist coin, non-cooperation with outsiders can lead to sometimes extreme conflict between various ethno-nations.

Can one rationally explain the extremes of ethno-national conflict? Authors like Russell Hardin propose to do so in terms of a general view of when hostile behavior is rational: most typically, if an individual has no reason to trust someone, it is reasonable for that individual to take precautions against the other. If both sides take precautions, however, each will tend to see the other as increasingly inimical.

It then becomes rational to start treating the other as an enemy. Mere suspicion can thus lead by small, individually rational steps to a situation of conflict.

Such negative development is often presented as a variant of the Prisoner's Dilemma; see the entry on prisoner's dilemma. It is relatively easy to spot the circumstances in which this general pattern applies to national solidarities and conflicts see also Wimmer It has enabled the application of conceptual tools from game-theoretic and economic analyses of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior to the explanation of ethno-nationalism. It is worth mentioning, however, that the individualist rational-choice approach, centered upon personal rationality, has serious competitors.

A tradition in social psychology, initiated by Henri Tajfel , shows that individuals may identify with a randomly selected group even when membership in the group brings no tangible rewards. Does rationality of any kind underlie this tendency to identification?

They propose a non-personal, evolutionary sort of rationality: individuals who develop a sentiment of identification and sense of belonging end up better off in the evolutionary race; hence we have inherited such propensities.

Initially, sentiments were reserved for kin, supporting the spreading of one's own genes. But cultural evolution has taken over the mechanisms of identification that initially developed within biological evolution.

As a result, we project the sentiment originally reserved for kinship onto our cultural group. More detailed explanations from socio-biological perspectives differ greatly among themselves and constitute a wide and rather promising research program see an overview in Goetze There is a growing literature connecting these issues with cognitive science, from Searle-White to Hogan and Yack One cannot choose to belong.

Why is national belonging taken to be involuntary? It is often attributed to the involuntary nature of linguistic belonging: a child does not decide which language will become her or his mother tongue, and one's mother tongue is often regarded as the most important depository of concepts, knowledge, social and cultural significance.

All these are embedded in the language, and do not exist without it. Early socialization is seen as socialization into a specific culture, and very often that culture is just assumed to be a national one. The resulting belonging is then to a large extent non-voluntary. There are exceptions to this basically non-voluntaristic view: for instance, theoretical nationalists who accept voluntary changes of nationality.

The politically central point is 2 : the actions enjoined by the nationalist. To these we now turn, beginning with sovereignty and territory, the usual foci of a national struggle for independence. They raise an important issue: 2a Does political sovereignty within or over a territory require statehood or something weaker?

The classical answer is that a state is required.

Metabolismo Ultra Poderoso by Frank Suarez

A more liberal answer is that some form of political autonomy suffices. Once this has been discussed, we can turn to the related normative issues: 2b What actions are morally permitted to achieve sovereignty and to maintain it?

Consider first the classical nationalist answer to 2a. Developments of this line of thought often state or imply specific answers to 2b , and 2c , i.

However, classical nationalism is not only concerned with the creation of a state but also with its maintenance and strengthening.

Nationalism is sometimes used to promote claims for the expansion of a state even at the cost of wars and for isolationist policies. Expansion is often justified by appeal to the unfinished business of bringing literally all members of the nation under one state and sometimes by territorial and resource interests. As for maintenance of sovereignty by peaceful and merely ideological means, political nationalism is closely tied to cultural nationalism.

The latter insists upon the preservation and transmission of a given culture, or more accurately, of recognizably ethno-national traits of the culture in its pure form, dedicating artistic creation, education and research to this goal.

Of course, the ethno-national traits to be preserved can be actual or invented, partly or fully so. Its force trumps other interests and even other rights a trump which is often needed in order to carry out the national independence struggle. In consequence, classical nationalism has something to say about the ranking of attitudes as well: in response to 1e , caring for one's nation is given the status of a fundamental duty for each of its members, and in answer to 1f , the scope is taken as unlimited.

Classical nationalists are usually vigilant about the kind of culture they protect and promote and about the kind of attitude people have to their nation-state. This watchful attitude carries some potential dangers: many elements of a given culture that are universalist or simply not recognizably national may fall prey to such nationalist enthusiasms.

Classical nationalism in everyday life puts various additional demands on individuals, from downloading more expensive home-produced goods in preference to cheaper imported ones to procreating as many future members of the nation as one can manage. See Yuval-Davies , and Yack Besides classical nationalism and its more radical extremist cousins , various moderate views are also nowadays classified as nationalist. Indeed, the philosophical discussion has shifted to these moderate or even ultra-moderate forms, and most philosophers who describe themselves as nationalists propose very moderate nationalist programs.

Let me characterize these briefly: Nationalism in a wider sense is any complex of attitudes, claims and directives for action ascribing a fundamental political, moral and cultural value to nation and nationality and deriving obligations for individual members of the nation, and for any involved third parties, individual or collective from this ascribed value.

Nationalisms in this wider sense can vary somewhat in their conceptions of the nation which are often left implicit in their discourse , in the grounds for and degree of its value, and in the scope of their prescribed obligations.

The term can also be applied to other cases not covered by classical nationalism, for instance to the hypothetical pre-state political forms that an ethnic identity might take. The variations of nationalism most relevant for philosophy are those that influence the moral standing of claims and of recommended nationalist practices. The central theoretical nationalist evaluative claims can be charted on the map of possible positions within political theory in the following useful but somewhat simplified and schematic way.

Nationalist claims featuring the nation as central to political action must answer two crucial general questions. First, is there one kind of large social group smaller than the whole of mankind that is of special moral importance? The nationalist answer is that there is just one, namely, the nation. When an ultimate choice is to be made, the nation has priority. This answer is implied by rather standard definitions of nationalism offered by Berlin, discussed in Section 1.

Are they based on voluntary or involuntary membership in the group? The typical contemporary nationalist thinker opts for the latter, while admitting that voluntary endorsement of one's national identity is a morally important achievement.

On the philosophical map, pro-nationalist normative tastes fit nicely with the communitarian stance in general: most pro-nationalist philosophers are communitarians who choose the nation as the preferred community in contrast to those of their fellow communitarians who prefer more far-ranging communities, such as those defined by global religious traditions.

However, some writers who describe themselves as liberal nationalists, prominently including Will Kymlicka , , , reject communitarian underpinning.

Before proceeding to moral claims, let me briefly sketch the issues and viewpoints connected to territory and territorial rights that are essential for nationalist political programs. I am adapting the excellent taxonomy of A. Kollers , Ch. Why is territory important for ethno-national groups, and what are the extent and grounds of territorial rights? Its primary importance resides in sovereignty and all the associated possibilities for internal control and external exclusion.

What about the grounds for the demand for territorial rights? Nationalist and pro-nationalist views mostly rely on the attachment that members of a nation have to national territory and to the formative value of territory for a nation to justify territorial claims see Miller and Meissels , with some refinements discussed below.

These attachment views stand in stark contrast to more pragmatic views about territorial rights as means for conflict resolution e. Another quite popular alternative is the family of individualistic views grounding territorial rights in rights and interests of individuals, for instance in their human rights Buchanan , pre-political Lockean property rights Simmons , individual resource rights Steiner , or political association rights Wellman Some of the authors mentioned are cosmopolitan critics of nationalism, most prominently Buchanan and Pogge.

We shall first describe the very heart of the nationalist program, i. These claims can be seen as answers to the normative subset of our initial questions about 1 pro-national attitudes and 2 actions. We will see that these claims recommend various courses of action: centrally, those meant to secure and sustain a political organization — preferably a state — for the given ethno-cultural national community thereby making more specific the answers to our normative questions 1e , 1f , 2b , and 2c.

Finally, we shall discuss various lines of pro-nationalist thought that have been put forward in defense of these claims. To begin, let us return to the claims concerning the furthering of the national state and culture. These are proposed by the nationalist as norms of conduct. The philosophically most important variations concern three aspects of such normative claims: i The normative nature and strength of the claim: does it promote merely a right say, to have and maintain a form of political self-government, preferably and typically a state, or have cultural life centered upon a recognizably ethno-national culture , or a moral obligation to get and maintain one , or a moral, legal and political obligation?

The strongest claim is typical of classical nationalism; its typical norms are both moral and, once the nation-state is in place, legally enforceable obligations for all parties concerned, including for the individual members of the ethno-nation.

The force of the nationalist claim is here being weighed against the force of other claims, including those of individual or group interests or rights. Variations in comparative strength of nationalist claims take place on a continuum between two extremes. At one rather unpalatable extreme, nation-focused claims take precedence over any other claims, including over human rights. Further towards the center is the classical nationalism that gives nation-centered claims precedence over individual interests and many needs including pragmatic collective utility , but not necessarily over general human rights.

See, for example, McIntyre , Oldenquist On the opposite end, which is mild, humane and liberal, the central nationalist claims are accorded prima facie status only see Tamir , Gans , and most recently Miller's book, which looks for a compromise.

What is their scope? One approach claims that they are valid for every ethno-nation and thereby universal. To put it more officially Universalizing nationalism is the political program that claims that every ethno-nation should have a state that it should rightfully own and the interests of which it should promote. The most difficult and indeed chauvinistic sub-case of particularism, i. Classical nationalism comes in both particularistic and universalistic varieties.

Although the three dimensions of variation — internal strength, comparative strength, and scope — are logically independent, they are psychologically and politically intertwined. People who are radical in one respect tend also to be radical in other respects. In other words, certain clusters of attitudes appear to be most stable, so that extreme or moderate attitudes on one dimension psychologically and politically belong with extreme or moderate ones on others.

Pairing extreme attitudes on one dimension with moderate ones on the others is psychologically and socially unstable. Put starkly, the view is that morality ends at the boundaries of the nation-state; beyond there is nothing but anarchy.

The view is explicit in Friederich Meinecke , Introduction and Raymond Aron and very close to the surface in Hans Morgenthau ; for interesting links with contemporary nationalisms, see the paper by Michael C. Williams and the book edited by Duncan Bell It nicely complements the main classical nationalist claim about nation-state, i. Is national partiality justified, and to what extent? What actions are appropriate to bring about sovereignty? In particular, are ethno-national states and institutionally protected ethno- national cultures goods independent from the individual will of their members, and how far may one go in protecting them?

The philosophical debate for and against nationalism is a debate about the moral validity of its central claims. In particular the ultimate moral issue is the following: is any form of nationalism morally permissible or justified, and, if not, how bad are particular forms of it?

For debates on partiality in general, see Chatterjee and Smith and, more recently, Feltham and Cottingham Why do nationalist claims require a defense? In some situations they seem plausible: for instance, the plight of some stateless national groups — the history of Jews and Armenians, the historical and contemporary misfortunes of Kurds — lends credence to the idea that having their own state would have solved the worst problems.

Still, there are good reasons to examine nationalist claims more carefully. The most general reason is that it should first be shown that the political form of nation state has some value as such, that a national community has a particular, or even central, moral and political value, and that claims in its favor have normative validity. Once this is established, a further defense is needed. Some classical nationalist claims appear to clash — at least under normal circumstances of contemporary life — with various values that people tend to accept.

Some of these values are considered essential to liberal-democratic societies, while others are important specifically for the flourishing of creativity and culture. The main values in the first set are individual autonomy and benevolent impartiality most prominently towards members of groups culturally different from one's own. The alleged special duties towards one's ethno-national culture can and often do interfere with individuals' right to autonomy.

Also, construed too strictly these duties can interfere with other individual rights, e. Many feminist authors have noted that the typical nationalist suggestion that women have a moral obligation to give birth to new members of the nation and to nurture them for the sake of the nation clashes with both the autonomy and the privacy of these women Yuval-Davis , Moller-Okin , and , and the discussion in the volume on Okin, Satz et al.

Another endangered value is diversity within the ethno-national community, which can also be thwarted by the homogeneity of a central national culture. Nation-oriented duties also interfere with the value of unconstrained creativity. For example, telling writers, musicians or philosophers that they have a special duty to promote national heritage interferes with the freedom of creation. The question here is not whether these individuals have the right to promote their national heritage, but whether they have a duty to do so.

Between these two sets of endangered values, the autonomy-centered and creativity-centered ones, fall values that seem to arise from ordinary needs of people living under ordinary circumstances Barry In many modern states, citizens of different ethnic background live together and very often value this kind of life. The very fact of cohabitation seems to be a good that should be upheld. Nationalism does not tend to foster this kind of multiculturalism and pluralism, judging from both theory especially the classical nationalist one and experience.

But the problems get worse. In practice, it does not seem accidental that the invidious particularistic form of nationalism, claiming rights for one's own people and denying them to others, is so widespread. The source of the problem is the competition for scarce resources: as Ernst Gellner famously pointed out, there is too little territory for all candidate ethnic groups to have a state, and the same goes for other goods demanded by nationalists for the exclusive use of their co-nationals.

According to some authors McCabe , the invidious variant is more coherent than any other form of nationalism: if one values one's own ethnic group highly the simplest way is to value it tout court.

If one definitely prefers one's own culture in all respects to any foreign one, it is a waste of time and attention to bother about others.

The universalist, non-invidious variant introduces enormous psychological and political complications. These arise from a tension between spontaneous attachment to one's own community and the demand to regard all communities with an equal eye. This tension might make the humane, non-invidious position psychologically unstable, difficult to uphold in situations of conflict and crisis, and politically less efficient.

Philosophers sympathetic to nationalism are aware of the evils that historical nationalism has produced and usually distance themselves from these. In order to help the reader find his or her way through this involved debate, we shall briefly summarize the considerations which are open to the ethno-nationalist to defend his or her case.

Compare the useful overview in Lichtenberg Further lines of thought built upon these considerations can be used to defend very different varieties of nationalism, from radical to very moderate ones. It is important to offer a warning concerning the key assumptions and premises figuring in each of the lines of thought summarized below: namely, that the assumptions often live an independent life in the philosophical literature.

Some of them figure in the proposed defenses of various traditional views which have little to do with the concept of a nation in particular. For brevity, I shall reduce each line of thought to a brief argument; the actual debate is more involved than one can represent in a sketch. I shall indicate, in brackets, some prominent lines of criticism that have been put forward in the debate.

These are discussed in greater detail in Miscevic The main arguments in favor of nationalism purporting to establish its fundamental claims about state and culture will be divided into two sets. The first set of arguments defends the claim that national communities have a high value, often seen as non-instrumental and independent of the wishes and choices of their individual members, and argues that they should therefore be protected by means of state and official statist policies.

The first set will be presented here in more detail, since it has formed the core of the debate. It depicts the community as the deep source of value or as the unique transmission device connecting its members to some important values.